THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Malta and the Archbishop of Canterbury

The integration of Malta with the United Kingdom is a great and imaginative scheme. It is fully in keeping with the statesmanship which since the end of the Second World War has succeeded in transforming much of the colonial Empire into the multi-racial Commonwealth. It is imaginative, because despite profound differences of history, race, religion and culture between the two peoples, it is conceived as a relationship which will benefit the long-term interests of each, and that the identity of those interests will outweigh the immediate obstacles. But just because we are attempting something so entirely novel, the immediate difficulties must be faced before irrevocable decisions are taken. The Archbishop of Canterbury has performed no mean service in opening up the question of religious freedom, and *The Times* rightly gave his statement full weight and publicity.

Sir Kenneth Grubb's motion before the Church Assembly on 12th February called attention to the 'discriminating disabilities inconsistent with the right of tolerance' which religious minorities were sufferng in Malta, and urged that no scheme for integration should be accepted which did not include 'specific guarantees for religious freedom in Malta under the civil law'. The Archbishop in his speech drew attention to Section 3 of the present constitution of Malta which guarantees religious liberty, but expressed his increasing uneasiness that this Section was not in fact being observed. Speaking slowly and with great emphasis, he added: 'In recent months I began to wonder whether it should not be made quite plain that in the view of the Church of England and of other Churches, the Roman Catholic Church in Malta must be prepared to see Anglicans and others exercising the same liberties of conscience and religious profession and enjoying the same ecclesiastical freedoms as are an

essential part of our constitutional freedom here, and, indeed, of the British way of life.' One might add, not only of the British way, but the way of all those to whom the United Nations Charter is not a mockery.

The immediate reactions in Malta have been unfavourable. The political view expressed in the *Times of Malta* and *Torch*, the newspaper of the General Workers' Union, was that moves for greater liberty coming from Churches other than the Roman Catholic would damage the cause of integration. The Roman Catholic *Lehen is-Sewwa*, amid some irrelevant arguments about events in 1814 and 1839, attempted to tar Protestantism with a colonialist brush and invoke a Catholic self-determination as grounds for not accepting 'Protestant principles'.

The problem is undeniably difficult. Roman Catholicism is part and parcel of Malta's history, the debt her people owe to the Knights of St. John is great, and the hierarchy has been opposed to integration. Moreover, one would suspect that Malta shares with other peoples of southern Europe a profound ignorance of the Anglican Communion, and that ignorance is an easy prey to irrational fear and fanaticism. On the other hand, freedom of religion is part of the British tradition, and the Anglican Communion and Free Churches represent a round 80 per cent of the nation. That is not a tradition to be cast aside. Integration is now facing its severest test.

It seems to us that the most hopeful approach would be to take each problem and disability in turn and see whether agreement could not be reached on each without either side being forced to a last-ditch stand on principle. It would seem, for instance, equally unreasonable for the Archbishop of Valetta to be prevented from wearing his canonicals in London as it is for the Archbishop of Canterbury from wearing his in Valetta. It is plain stupid that vilification of the Roman Catholic religion should cost the offender six months gaol while he can get away with three months for insulting the Church of England. On such matters agreement should be reasonably easy. The sticking-point is likely to be marriages. So long as the Roman Catholic Church does not recognize the right of Maltese to renounce their obedience to her and marry in other churches, and insists on regarding the offspring of such marriages as bastards, no progress will be possible.

The lengths to which the hierarchy will go, given the chance, to blacken the repute of nominal Roman Catholics who accept a non-Roman ceremony is clear from the Prato affair. But even Rome does not like being ridiculed. The numbers involved in such cases are unlikely to be large. With increasing freedom of movement between Malta and the United Kingdom which integration would bring, a couple could snap their fingers at denunciations that they were 'Public Sinners'. Their children could hardly be legitimate in Hampstead and illegitimate in Gozo, both now forming part of the same United Kingdom. They would

have the full weight of British public opinion behind them and also the laws of libel in this country.

It may be that the rock on which the whole scheme of integration could founder could also be a starting-point for useful conversations between the non-Roman and Roman Communions. The history of British diplomacy over the last century has shown that it is always easier to discuss and settle specific grievances. It may be in this case too. Basically, it is a test of good-will. The co-existence of the non-Roman and Roman worlds in the long run will be as important to the welfare of mankind as the co-existence of East and West. Indeed, if the one is not achieved, the West will be too divided to achieve the other. Malta could be a turning-point. The Church Assembly has shown the highest political wisdom in bringing the question to public notice now.

The Prato Affair

English people sometimes wonder why Communism should be so strong in Italy. The Prato affair should help to solve that enigma.

Whatever the ultimate outcome, the condemnation by a Florence court of the Bishop of Prato for the defamation of Signor Bellandi and his wife will have a lasting significance. Not merely is this the first important case for thirty years concerning the interpretation of the 1929 Concordat, but it reveals as few cases have the chasm that divides non-Roman Catholics and Roman Catholics in Western Europe. In the event, the Roman Catholic authorities have acted with extraordinary ineptitude, and they have suffered a serious setback. To attempt to enforce a religious ceremony on an atheistic grocer and his bride would seem to imply no great respect for the Sacraments. When the Bellandis preferred the civil ceremony which accorded with their views and to which they were by law entitled, it was folly to interfere. Then, not only to denounce them by name as 'public concubines', but to attempt to ruin them socially and professionally, was to alienate the feelings of all decent-minded people. To argue in court that an individual possessed an 'ecclesiastical' as opposed to a 'civil' reputation was a piece of sophistry which no self-respecting community could tolerate. These Roman Catholic authorities showed that they had no respect for the beliefs of others. What is more, the dignity of the Italian State was at issue, for it could hardly ignore the implications of the Bishop's condemnation of the couple as living in concubinage when their marriage was validly contracted according to the law of the land. However, the Bishop refused to appear in court to answer the charge against him. He argued that this was a Church matter and not a question for the civil authorities.

He would have been more consistent if he had refused to defend himself as well: but he appointed legal representatives for the task. The point at stake is really simple enough. Were the Bishop's words slanderous

according to the definition statutorily laid down? If they were, the Bishop might consider it his solemn duty to break the law, but could hardly complain if the law took reprisals. The law did take reprisals, but the Bishop did complain. To make sure that the world should know the whole Church was behind him the Archbishop of the Province ordered special mourning in the churches. To help matters along, the Pope himself cancelled his coronation anniversary celebrations by way of protest. The world must by now be accustomed to the Pope; but he is still the unchallenged head of the Holy Roman Church.

The immediate effect may well be a gain for the Italian Left. A secular court has shown itself more alive to the quality of mercy than a Christian bishop. Nevertheless, a blow for human liberty and the sanctity of the home has been struck, and notice is served on the Western world of the real character of Roman Catholicism when in a position of power. The threatened solemn Papal excommunication of the judges (they are now themselves 'public sinners') merely emphasizes the fact.

At least the world knows after this how it stands in relation to that body. All of us whose marriages are not celebrated according to the rules of the Holy Roman Church are living in concubinage and are public sinners. The hierarchy of the Holy Roman Church consider themselves above the law which gives them protection and at liberty to insult or injure anybody outside their Communion as much as they please. The faithful are expected to stand by them if the rest of the community object.

It is understood that the victim couple were baptized but had wished to repudiate the Roman Church. The man himself had become a Communist. If that is how the Church behaves in Italy he can hardly be blamed. Unfortunately it is how it behaves wherever it has opportunity. No amount of glossing and explaining away will avail to erase the impression the Prato incident has made. Incidents of this kind make of the Roman Church one of the most effective arguments for atheism in existence.

Yet such an attitude of mind as the incident reveals is inevitable in an institution that claims to be the sole repository of truth, which consigns all outside its membership to uncovenanted mercy, and which, with its claim to infallibility, touches the absolute in authoritarianism. There is very little authoritarianism that will bear close examination, but the kind manifested in the Prato incident has no defence. It knows neither charity nor humility.

Canons Withdrawn

When questions were asked as to why a new declaration of obedience, to be made whenever a new ecclesiastical appointment was accepted, should have been included in the draft of the revised Canons, the answer was always clear and unequivocal. The Oath of Canonical Obedience was

not enough. The new declaration was the heart of the new system. Without it we might as well not have any Canons at all. The question of conscience did not arise since it was not a declaration of assent but of obedience—as if there could be any difference in spiritual matters when men of honour were concerned.

Some of us raised an emphatic protest. Now, not only has that Canon been withdrawn but also the 'penalties' Canon as well. It seems suddenly to have been discovered that since actually it made no difference, there was no point in passing it into law. The Oath of Canonical Obedience was sufficient after all. The withdrawal was passed off in the Canterbury Convocation in a rather light-hearted manner.

But the declaration did make a difference. In the first place, it was more strictly worded and categorical than the Oath. The loophole for conscience was blocked up. What is just as important, surely the fact of reiteration in stronger terms changes the whole climate. A young man courting a woman is expected to vow his undying love. If he is a wise husband he will renew his asseverations from time to time. If he is a devoted one, he will do so naturally and spontaneously. But if the wife insists upon frequent statement in set terms, the man will begin to think she distrusts him. He will probably be correct. It is a jealous and fearful wife, not a confident one, who requires a daily avowal. Little by little the distrust is communicated and arouses resentment. Divorces have occurred as a consequence of this attitude. It would have been the same with this declaration.

What most created resentment was the distrust of the clergy it expressed. Why should the authorities of the Church distrust the clergy? Would not an attitude of mutual confidence and spontaneous loyalty be preferable? It would be more than a pity if an atmosphere developed in which the clergy and the hierarchy thought of themselves as two sides, like the trade unions and employers, or like the men and their officers in a bad regiment. That is to be avoided at all costs, and Canons that could help in generating that kind of climate, even if their legal force was small, are wisely withdrawn.

Religion in Rumania

From a Danish correspondent comes a long account of a journey he recently undertook in Rumania to establish contact with the Orthodox Church there. He paints a happy picture of the relationship existing between the clergy and the people. From what he writes it would not appear that ideological considerations have made much difference to the mutual friendliness and confidence that make the priest one with his community. Most of the people he buttonholed seemed to be regular in attendance at divine service, and the churches he saw were well used for private prayer when services were not in progress.

Unlike some other Communist countries, the monastic system, which is deeply entrenched, has been little affected by the changes of the past few years. Monks and nuns are expected to work and are set a regular quota by the government, but otherwise seem to suffer no interference. The Patriarch Justinian has worked to improve the theological training of the nuns and seminaries have been established for the purpose. The Church as a whole seems to be left in control of itself, with a strong lay element on the administrative side.

Some Encouraging Signs

One is always chary about accepting statements regarding 'religious revival', especially if their authors are clergy themselves. The Cambridge undergraduate newspaper, *Varsity*, has however printed some facts which suggest that at least the interest in things religious is on the increase.* It appears that Christians as well as non-Christians are re-assessing their attitude to religion. In college after college the Deans report substantial increases among communicants and at evensong. In two years the number of communicants at Great St. Mary's has been doubled from 3,000 to 6,000. Even in some of the 'redundant' churches near the centre of the town the congregations are good. Nor is this apparently due to a revival of various Fundamentalisms. C.I.C.C.U. retains a steady membership of about 350, and Rome of around 300 (their own figures in each case) out of an undergraduate population of about 8,000. On the contrary, we are told, 'Liberal Anglicanism is in the ascendant, but it combines a healthy agnosticism with conviction on matters of basic importance.' There is, too, both inside and outside college chapels, an increasing degree of co-operation between the Anglican and Free Churches. All this is to the good. It reflects itself in the high standard of the ordinands at the University. It is an encouraging prelude to Lambeth. The Anglican Communion is showing itself representative of the up and coming as well as of tradition and the past.

**Varsity*, Saturday, 1st March, 1958

THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS OF 1848: WHO THEY WERE AND WHAT THEY STOOD FOR

By A. Douglas Millard

THE Established Church has a poor propaganda department. Of the sins of the Church in the matter of social justice we hear a great deal, but of the merits of some of the noblest of Christian reformers we hear very little. Yet few movements in the whole history of social reform have thrown up such a vital and unique group of personalities as those known to history as the Christian Socialists of eighteen forty-eight. Forgotten by the Church on one hand, and ignored or vilified by the materialist Left on the other, they certainly deserved a better fate. Perhaps the liberal theological tendencies of their leader have made them objects of suspicion in the circles of the ultra-orthodox, while the measure of the Christian Faith that was professed by such men as Vansittart Neale may not have passed creedal tests. But however mistaken some of their notions, and however gigantic some of their failures, few men have served their day and generation with such whole-hearted devotion and given so liberally without counting the cost.

Until the comparatively recent researches of Canon C. E. Raven paid adequate tribute, it was left to the avowed atheist G. J. Holyoake to assess the value of their work as social reformers. 'No less honour and regard are due,' he wrote, 'to these gentlemen, who owning the Christian faith, and having the advantage of higher culture than befell the majority of the humble members of the movement, did not hesitate to risk the unpopularity of sympathy with their rightful aims, and made sacrifices greater in a pecuniary sense, in order that social equity might prevail in common life, and commerce be redeemed from fraud and the poor from precariousness. With wider knowledge—with exacter aims—they with patient and laborious attentiveness, incredible save to those who saw it daily—advanced step by step the great Co-operative Movement to stages of legality and security.'

The Christian Socialist movement of 1848 was not a carefully planned political organization with officers, an elaborate constitution, and a mass membership. On the contrary, it was a tiny group of intensely sensitive and comparatively comfortable men thrown together almost by accident rather than by design; a movement created in a moment by the urgent needs of the hour. The movement was born out of the failure of Chartism. The six points of the charter were first formulated in 1838, and the ten years that followed were years of intense agitation; they were years too of widespread poverty and unrest. The unrest was not confined to this country, and was symptomatic of the state of Europe as a whole,

but the Industrial Revolution was more far-reaching in England than on the continent. Hitherto England had been a country like any other, after the Industrial Revolution it was unlike any other. Urban populations grew with astonishing speed, railways were built, pits sunk, canals excavated on an unprecedented scale, but all at an appalling cost in human suffering. The fearful overcrowding of the cities and lack of proper sanitation brought dreadful epidemics, and the slums which still degrade our larger industrial towns, not to mention the horrors of child labour. C. F. G. Masterman writes of 'the hungry forties' as a 'hell deeper and wider than any to which the working-classes of this country had before descended.'

These ten years of agitation were to culminate in the presentation of a monster petition, said to contain no less than 6,000,000 signatures, to Parliament after a gigantic meeting at Kennington Common. Kingsley's novel, *Alton Locke*, gives a vivid description both of the mood of alarm and expectancy in London and of the sordid fiasco of the meeting, and has been described as 'the earliest piece of socialistic fiction we possess'. No less than 150,000 special constables were enrolled to protect the capital city from the anticipated assaults of the mob, which in point of fact melted miserably away in the rain, while a deputation of five men conveyed the petition to the House of Commons in a respectable cab.

It was on this very morning of the 10th April, 1848, with all London in a panic of apprehension, that saw the beginnings of the little group. Charles Kingsley, squire-parson of Eversley, chafing at his exile in the country and alarmed by rumours of happenings in London, came post-haste to town and made for F. D. Maurice, theologian and University Professor, who in turn gave him a letter of introduction to James Malcolm Ludlow, lately returned from Paris and deeply interested in the ferment of political and social ideas recurrent in the French capital. The last two spent the remainder of the day together, and by the evening were firm friends. In the late afternoon they had set off for Kennington and got as far as Waterloo Bridge when they met the pathetic remnants of the Chartist 'mob' trudging miserably home through the driving rain. With the latest news of the fiasco, they returned to discuss the situation with Maurice.

That night the three men, hitherto almost complete strangers to each other, determined to act. Before morning they had resolved to placard London with posters and to issue a set of 'Tracts for the Times' addressed to the ruling classes. Thus was the Christian Socialist movement born.

And they were as good as their word. A poster addressed to 'Workmen of England' and signed by 'A Working Parson' appeared on the walls the very next day. It assured the workers that their wrongs were not unknown or forgotten; it says 'the Charter is not bad *if the men who use it are not bad*', a note that is dominant in all their writings, and con-

cludes: 'There will be no true freedom without virtue, no true science without religion, no true industry without the fear of God and love of your fellow-citizens. Workers of England, be wise, and then you *must* be free, for you will be *fit* to be free!'

The following day, 12th April, the group met in full for the first time and, acting on Ludlow's advice, decided to commence a new journal, 'A Penny People's Friend', for the workers and middle-class, and a series of tracts for the clergy and for Christians in particular. But funds would not run to the two ventures, and it was therefore decided to venture upon the paper with Maurice and Ludlow as joint editors. *Politics for the People* was the title chosen for the new periodical. Seventeen numbers of the little paper were issued, the vast majority of the matter being written by the founders of the movement, although Ludlow himself, under his pseudonym *John Townsend*, seems to have written a third of an entire issue.

'It is proposed in this paper,' the proprietors announce, 'to consider the questions that are most occupying our countrymen at the moment, such as the Extension of the Suffrage; the relation of the Capitalist to the Labourer; what a Government can and cannot do to find work or pay for the Poor . . . There is leisure for deliberation now—a year hence there may not be.'

In the last sentence we detect that note of urgency that runs through all the thought of the Christian Socialists, and indeed all reformers at this time. Revolution was always round the corner, and news from France constantly fanned the flame of fear.

While the tone of the paper was steadily moderate, it met with little but abuse not only from the relatives and friends of the founders and the clergy, but also from the workers, by whom parsons with aristocratic connections were naturally suspect. Moreover, it reacted quickly upon the head of the impetuous Kingsley, who was summarily rejected for an appointment at King's College.

Seventeen numbers of *Politics for the People* were issued in all, and the circulation reached 2,000 per week, but there seemed no chance of making it an economic success. Advertisements were impossible and the journal was boycotted by the more respectable newsagents.

It is well worth while taking a closer look at the men who were the heart and soul of the movement. In the first place, we have Frederick Denison Maurice, the prophet of the group, scholar, mystic and Christian-Platonist. A man towering head and shoulders above his fellows, ahead of his time in the realm of theology as well as social reform. His approach to the social problem was essentially that of a man of religion; it is men and their well-being, and not political scheming, in which he is primarily interested.

John Malcolm Ludlow, the second of the founders, was, on the other

hand, a man of the world, a man of metropolitan experience. Born in India, educated in France and member of the English Bar, he was widely read as well as widely travelled. Something of a philosopher and a student of social arrangements, he was as much at home in Paris (then a hotbed of social planning of one kind and another) as in London. It was he who was the real socialist of the movement. It was Ludlow who converted them to socialism, and it was Ludlow who thought out and moulded their particular brand of socialist philosophy.

It is a pity that 'Parson Lot', the third member of the group, is associated in the popular mind merely with the writing of novels. For if Charles Kingsley's two colleagues supplied the philosophy, both religious and political, he undoubtedly supplied much of the drive behind their propaganda. Possessed of both great physical energy and a virile pen, he threw himself, so far as his clerical duties would allow, into the van of the movement in its early days. Unfortunately, his widow, who felt it incumbent on her to write her husband's biography, is at pains to slur over this most honourable part of his career, and paints a detailed but inadequate portrait of a squire-parson and popular novelist.

The fourth member of the original band, Edward Vansittart Neale, does not make so colourful a figure as his colleagues, yet he had a very important part to play in the life of the movement. A lawyer by profession, his contacts with the world were altogether of a different order from the others; he did not pretend to be a scholar or teacher, nor was he set apart from the world of men. It would be unfair to call him the 'business man' of the group, but there can be no doubt that his legal experience and contacts with the wider world of men made his judgments of particular value to his colleagues in this enterprise. Even though the orthodoxy of his Christianity has sometimes been called to question, there can be no doubt about his high idealism and his loyalty to his colleagues.

An older man than Hughes or Ludlow, he was also a man of means, and not disposed to be half-hearted in any task to which he put his hand. If Neale's religious orthodoxy was suspect by some, his integrity and generosity appear to have made an indelible impression. 'He was,' wrote a continental contemporary at the time of his death, 'a unique man . . . a hero and a saint.'

Of the other original members, one other deserves special mention. Tom Hughes,[1] old Rugbeian just down from Oxford, with an immense reputation as an athlete. It was Maurice, surprisingly enough, who first introduced the young graduate to the others, and it is said that his suggestion was received with laughter. But to turn down 'the Prophet' was another matter, and it was not long before the wisdom of their leader

[1] Later famous as the author of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*; he was called to the Bar and became a Q.C.

was obvious. Of Hughes it has been written that he was 'a man of child-like heart, of knightly loyalty, of the most humane geniality, and of the simplest Christian faith'. And to the end of a long life he remained the devoted servant of those ideals to whom he had pledged himself in early manhood. Moreover, his coming was an immense asset to his colleagues; he was not a 'stuffy professor', a parson or a crank, but a strong, healthy, virile man, the hero of the public and sporting press. And in Hughes they all found a tower of sympathy and strength, to whom they turned in their difficulties and into his sympathetic ear they poured their troubles.

'The name (Christian Socialists) was apparently adopted,' writes C. F. G. Masterman, in his biography of Maurice, 'with the desire to offend the maximum number of persons on both sides.' Maurice himself, on the other hand, said it was 'to commit us once and for all to the conflict that we must engage in sooner or later with the unsocial Christians and the unChristian socialists'. . . . 'I seriously believe that Christianity is the only foundation of socialism and that a true socialism is the necessary result of a sound Christianity.'

It is important to try to understand the particular brand of socialist thought that characterized the little group in contradistinction to the orthodox Fabian state-socialism of the Left of our own day. In the first place their political belief was rooted and grounded in their Christian faith. They wanted to 'buy their coats without sinning against God', as they so quaintly put it, referring to the terrible sweating in the clothing industry at that time. Maurice starts from human and moral grounds, not theoretical and economic; he is concerned with men and not with problems. The whole competitive principle, with its postulates of selfishness and conflict, is a denial of that law of love, and a repudiation of the law of Christ, he argued. Society is not a soul-less machine that has got out of joint and can be adjusted by an ingenious manipulation of wheels and pulleys, but a corporation of living souls. It must be brought back to its brotherhood in Christ.

Maurice has often been accused of extreme caution in this aspect of his career, but there can be no doubt that with such a strong team possessed of such great physical and mental vitality, a brake was sometimes useful and necessary, but no one can accuse him of lack of candour when once his mind was made up. 'The watchword of the socialist is co-operation' he declares, 'the watchword of the anti-socialist is competition. Anyone who recognizes that the principle of co-operation is stronger and truer than that of competition has a right to the honour or disgrace of being called a socialist.' A 'complete drenching of his whole being in Christianity' made it impossible for him to tolerate *laissez-faire*, and his career proves that he was not a man to flinch when once he saw his duty.

It was on to Maurice's conception of world-fellowship that Ludlow grafted Blanc-ian socialism, and out of which grew that vast number of

ventures in co-operative production by which the Christian Socialists are still remembered in the Co-operative movement and beyond.

Ludlow believed that the socialism of Louis Blanc satisfied the deepest instincts and highest ideals of the people. Where his English contemporaries saw only 'the red fool-fury of the Seine', he could decry a real inspiration and striving after brotherhood in the factory and workshop. It was in a letter to Maurice, to which we have already referred, describing the momentous happenings in Paris, that was the real beginning of the Christian Socialist movement of the forties. This letter Maurice had copied and circulated to friends. In a dedication to Ludlow of his book, *Learning and Working*, he tells of the 'very powerful effect' it had on his mind.

And the title of a pamphlet for which they were responsible, entitled *Strikes Superseded by Self-employment*, epitomizes their aim. The workers are to combine for the conduct of industry, not by capturing parliamentary seats but by forming self-governing co-operative workshops. The capitalist is to be driven out of business by the competition of the new order, rather than by the legislation of a working-class government. It is at root the same fundamental idea of industrial organization as that of the syndicalist, the guild socialist and the early co-operator. A conception of the socialistic ideal that crops up in every generation.

Trade Unionism to the Christian Socialists was but an uncreative halfway house, a purely defensive rearguard movement, while strikes were only negative and destructive methods. 'Association for work instead of for strikes' was the way out as Maurice saw it. Attempts to interest the Trade Unions in co-operative production, similar to that of Guild Socialists a generation or two later, seems to them a more constructive method of attacking capitalism. 'I want Trade Unionism to expand into humanity and finally lose itself in it,' wrote Ludlow, and foresaw all co-operative workshops uniting in 'one vast guild'.

Ludlow, writing on the Working Associations in Paris in Tracts on Christian Socialism No. IV, says that historically they 'tend in fact to bind up the broken chain of tradition by reconstituting on a broader and firmer basis the trading Guilds of the Middle Ages'.

The Christian Socialists are sometimes depicted as a group of muddle-headed enthusiasts, with more energy than sense, who rushed headlong into half-baked schemes that they were incapable of bringing to fruition. True, they were thinkers rather than experienced men of business, but it is to their lasting credit that, unlike many social theorists, they were not content to build their castles in the air and leave them there. They made an honest endeavour to put their ideals into effect.

It was not until January 1850, after nearly two years of thought and discussion, that they formed a 'Society for Promoting Working Men's

Associations', which was to herald their experiments in practical socialism, namely, the self-governing workshops.

The first of these co-operative productive societies (for such they were, although they did not use the name) was the Castle Street tailors. This venture was organized, supplied with the necessary capital and equipment, worker-partners recruited and launched on its career within a month. Two associations of shoemakers, and a society of builders, were set in motion the same spring. A group of cobblers followed, an association of 'working bakers' and a printing society, all of which were operating by the autumn. The promoters supplied the capital, which was to be repaid eventually out of the trade surplus, and thereafter one-third of the annual surplus was to be put to reserve and the remaining two-thirds divided between the worker-partners as bonus on labour.

At first the tailors seemed to prosper, but the cobblers and builders were less successful, the workers being divided by quarrels, mainly about money, and unfortunately the manager's knowledge of book-keeping methods was often painfully inadequate. Then a premature attempt to establish a Central Agency for the purchase of raw materials for the various workshops led to disagreement among the promoters.

In 1852 a great strike of engineers provided some of the more venturesome Christian Socialists with the opportunity to put some of their theories into practice on a grand scale. Two groups of skilled engineers were formed into co-operative engineers' societies and set up in business, one in Southwark and the other at Mile End. Both experiments failed and the losses ran into thousands of pounds. By 1860 the last of the self-governing workshops was extinct, and the founders had to face the failure of their experiments as well as the loss of their money.

It is easy and fashionable to gibe at the bourgeoise origins of the leaders of the movement, but their colossal sacrifices for the cause mark them out as unusual men. The late Mary Hughes, the surviving daughter of Tom Hughes, once told the present writer that three times in childhood her family had to move from Mayfair to the suburbs through losses involved in financing unsuccessful ventures in co-operative production. How much E. V. Neale, the wealthiest of them, lost in the various experiments in co-operative productive societies sponsored by the group will never be known. E. O. Greening puts it down as no less than £60,000. At all events, he was forced to sell his West End house and country seat, live for many years with strictest economy, and finally accept a salaried position.

Socialism to the Christian Socialists meant brotherhood in the workshop. Thus socialism could not be imposed by legislation from above, by act of Parliament, it must grow from the workshop floor upwards. For F. D. Maurice and his comrades were psychologists without knowing it; self-discipline, pride in work and personal responsibility, are surely basic

to any decent system of society. Brotherhood cannot be planted in tens of thousands of hearts by blue books, any more than selfishness can suddenly be legislated out of men's minds. The foundations of a new and better world must be laid in men's hearts, and the vision and the determination to translate the vision into reality must begin at the bottom with the small group and grown even as the leaven grows until it permeates the whole lump.

These self-governing workshops of a hundred years ago into which the little group of Christian Socialists poured their money, failed. No doubt they were before their time. They made tremendous moral demands, for self-discipline, for sacrifice, and men were not yet ready to pay the price. They had not discovered, and they have not yet, that only in self-discipline is true freedom to be found. But it was a glorious failure; moreover, from that day forward no man could say that the Christian Church was no longer interested in social reform, and in their social thinking they surely lit a candle that will never be put out.

Indeed, their are signs and portents in our own day that the basic ideas behind the Christian Socialist propaganda of 1848 may yet come into their own.

Moreover, they left a permanent mark on co-operative history, for it was with their aid that the first Industrial and Provident Societies Act was placed on the statute book, thus securing for all time the legal status of co-operative societies. And the Working Men's College in Crowndale Road, London, which they were instrumental in starting, still functions after a century of activity.

KARL BARTH THINKS AGAIN

By E. L. Allen

Those of us who have made the attempt to follow Barth's thought since he launched the rocket of his *Römerbrief* are well aware that it has undergone very considerable modification in the meantime. True, the rocket in question continues to spin on around the theological world, renewed in successive editions, but its creator has long since been engaged elsewhere at the ground level. The first change came when he abandoned Kierkegaard for Anselm, when he ceased to challenge us with prophetic fervour and began to instruct us in a Protestant scholasticism. The second came when he began the section of his *Dogmatik* that deals with man, and before long we heard with wonder that man is God's—partner!

From time to time, no doubt, he had given us indications that he was well aware of what was taking place. But only now, in *Die Menschlichkeit Gottes*,[1] does he take stock of his development and share with us frankly his second thoughts. The revolt against liberalism was required, he tells us, but it went too far. Half the truth was said, but only half, and even that too vehemently. Liberalism was not all error, it contained *particula veri* to which justice must now be done. The primary truth —the Godhead of God—has been affirmed once for all, and there can be no going back upon it. But the time has now come when we may and must go on to the secondary truth—the humanity of God.

But how do we reach this? No one who has read Barth's other work will need to be told how he answers this question. In accordance with his starting-point in each section of the *Dogmatik*, so here, theology is Christology. All that we know of God derives from Jesus Christ. In him we see that God does not will to reign alone in splendour, that he wills to be God *for man*, to enter into covenant relation with him, to identify himself with him, to take his lot upon himself in order to redeem him. It is not that the earlier theology was mistaken in stressing the Godhead of God. But it was led astray by Kierkegaard's formula of 'the infinite qualitative difference'. It excluded humanity from divinity, whereas—in the sense just outlined—it is included within it.

'The Godhead of God, when rightly understood, includes his humanity.' This is the new principle, to which Barth gives full expression in the volume of the *Dogmatik*, now available in translation, that deals with reconciliation. From it certain consequences may be drawn. The first is a distinctive view of man. Every man has God for his Father and Jesus Christ for his brother: is not that the best guarantee of his dignity and his rights? Man's humanity remains in spite of the fall, and we must rid ourselves once for all of the absurd notion that God gains as we

[1] Theologische Studien, Heft 48. Evangelischer Verlag Ag. Zollikon-Zürich, Rm. 2.60.

blacken and degrade man. Grant that man's work so often ends in failure, it is the work to which God calls him; by God's will he makes and maintains his civilisations. We must speak more positively of the human than we once did.

A second consequence is for theology as such. This must find its theme, neither in God alone nor in man alone, but in the dialogue, the encounter, the communion between them. What God has done for men in Jesus Christ, how this has worked out in the course of history as men respond to it in gratitude—this is our concern. Existentialism has helped us to see that the liberals were right when they said that one cannot rightly speak of God without at the same time speaking of man. Only let us not forget that he only speaks rightly of man who does so in the context of God. Finally, theology is truest to itself, not when it constructs a system, but when it speaks *to* man in preaching and *for* him in prayer.

Thirdly, we must take the Church more seriously than we did in the days of crisis-theology. Then it was the all-too-human institution in which man defended himself by means of religion against the impact of the living God. That judgment need not be recalled, but it must be coupled with a confession of our solidarity with the Church as the sphere in which God deals with men. Barth is now prepared even to speak of the Church as necessary to salvation. 'We should be inhuman where God is human, we should be ashamed of Jesus Christ himself, were we to be ashamed of the Church.' The Church is the place where that fellowship of man with man that is the joy and crown of humanity is to be observed; more than that, it is the place in which God wills to be manifest in his humanity here on earth.

There is much here for which to be thankful, but there is occasion also for disappointment. Has Barth in fact fulfilled the promise of his title? Surely not. What he has given us is God's concern for man, his philanthropy (Titus iii.4), as he himself tells us. But the humanity of God goes much farther than that. At this point Barth sees a danger signal: whatever happens, he is resolved to avoid the Thomist doctrine of analogy. But what else can be meant by the humanity of God than that what is highest in man may rightly be predicated of God, because it belongs to him, albeit in yet higher form? What does the teaching of Jesus imply if not that a woman's concern for her lost coin, a shepherd's for his lost sheep, and a father's for his lost son, have all their counterparts in God?

Barth does well to stress the Godhead of God, but he still seems to think that we have access to this as something unmixed with human understanding so that we can apply it as an absolute criterion. But that is not the case at all. We are in constant danger of misapprehending God, and one criterion we must apply to all our thoughts about God is

how far they accord with what we judge to be good in ourselves. 'Nothing can be good in him that evil is in me.' By this criterion we reject double predestination and eternal punishment—and Barth is with us in both cases. By the humanity of God we mean that the spiritual life is one in him and us, and that as we set our hearts on truth and righteousness and love we participate in him.

POETIC STATEMENTS

By Brother George Every, S.S.M.

I want to consider two opposite estimates. The first is Freud's, or rather Freud's as interpreted by Mr. John Wren Lewis in a recent number of *The Modern Churchman*:[1]

Mr. Lewis is concerned with mythology. In his mind the most important question for theology to-day is whether 'the Christian Gospel may still have some significance apart from the *mythische Weltbild*'. This is Professor Bultmann's question, but mythology in Bultmann's sense includes poetry. To demythologize is to remove from the records of experience, including records of an experience that transcends ordinary experiences, every trace of projection, every illusion created by the poetic, the dramatic, the constructive imagination, and to expose the omen behind the poem; not the poem itself, but what made the poet write it; not the creed, not the liturgy, but the awe in the face of an actual and incommunicable voice or feeling or action, which drove men and women to mimetic actions, to liturgies, myths, creeds, and all kinds of poems.

This seems to me a necessary and a healthy activity, but to do it thoroughly requires a very thorough understanding of poetry. In Bultmann the word 'myth' shifts uneasily between primitive science (the three-story universe), popular folk-lore (the devils and demoniacs), and high poetry in St. Paul and St. John. To allow for these involves at least three different sets of problems, which need treatment by different methods. I should regard Dr. Farrer's work on St. Mark and St. John, which Mr. Wren Lewis treats with hostility and suspicion, as a contribution to the diagnosis which must precede any attempt to perform the delicate operation of demythologizing. No one can remove a myth who does not know what myth is. In this matter Freud is not a reliable guide, since

[1] July 1957.

> The important thing which psycho-analysis has discovered is that there is no sharp dividing-line between normal and abnormal psychology. There are certain tendencies in the human mind which lead to psychosis when exaggerated, and this tendency to feel life dominated by occult powers is one of them. Consequently religious mania and the ordinary mythological mode of thinking are not different in kind, but only in degree.

in *Totem and Taboo* he presents as science a picture of the growth of human and animal sacrifice that is mythological through and through, as mythological as his account of the life and death of Moses, supported by sparse evidence, and vulnerable at every point to the criticism of the anthropologist. Nevertheless Freud, Bultmann, and Mr. Wren Lewis are right in this, that we cannot abandon attempts to reach behind the myth, to feel and find the experience that gives rise to myth and ritual, to drama and religion, the unknown God behind all images and all Scriptures.

Our response to this experience cannot, however, escape incarnation in a word, whether the word is intended to explain it away, or to explicate it into theology and metaphysics. It is this horn of the dilemma that Mr. Owen Barfield seizes, in a book called *Saving the Appearances*, recently published by Faber & Faber (21/-). In Mr. Barfield's view the whole history of the phenomenal world is a history of thought, for the world we know, the world of phenomena, of appearances, is a system of collective representations. We know nothing except through mythology, for science, including psycho-analysis, is just as mythological, just as dependent on the projections and illusions of the observer as any previous collective representation or phenomenal world. The unrepresented is the unrepresented. We never experience such a thing as sheer sensation. To all the phenomenal world we stand in a relation of creator to creation, though only a rare genius, at rare moments, will create original phenomena. We generally see and hear the same things as one another, because most of our creations are in the common style of our own day.

In Mr. Barfield's view, the important difference between modern and older world views is not that modern science is more accurate, but that it is more arrogant. The real difference between Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy is not in two opposite notions of the centre of gravity in the universe, but in different ideas of knowledge. The old map of the stars was a map of appearances, of points at which the heavenly bodies, the real stars and planets, manifested themselves by signs in the heavens, which moved with regularity and accuracy in certain determined directions. The astrologer did not observe the physical structure of the stars. He read their signs and believed himself to be in communication with the heavenly powers for good or ill. But Galileo and his like identify the stars with balls of matter, fire, and light away in the outer spaces, the planets with worlds like ours. This step once taken, our passion for interplanetary travel follows in logical succession. But do we really know anything about the stars except their appearances? Do we know more about them than Sir John Davies, when he wrote in *Orchestra* of the music of the spheres?

Mr. Barfield, I think, would say that we do know more, but that what

we know is our knowledge that all we know has been shaped into its present pattern by the collective and common activities of human minds in the Western world. Sir John Davies and others in Tudor England believed that their civilization was the last. But philosophies pass, and science with them. What will be, and will be seen (and thought) depends on us, and on the Spirit working in us. Mr. Barfield, like Mr. Wren Lewis, would wish to be considered a not very orthodox Christian. Mr. Lewis, who is a Modern Churchman, seems to me the more orthodox of the two. Mr. Barfield's account of mediaeval science throws light on some turns and twists in the history of thought, but he seems to me to exaggerate the element of what he calls original participation in mediaeval thinking. I agree that many of the creatures in the mediaeval bestiaries inherit qualities from their divine progenitors, demons, nymphs, satyrs, but much mediaeval zoology was based on misinformation.

All collective representations of weasels in the Middle Ages conceived through their ears. All collective representations of weasels in modern times have normal forms of sexual intercourse. Mr. Barfield, as I understand him, would refuse to commit himself to any statement about unrepresented weasels. At any rate, he refuses to entertain accounts of natural conditions in the palaeolithic age that are based on our science, not on the science and art of the cave-dwellers. He will accept their painting and sculpture as evidence, but not geological and biological data whereby the dates of these paintings are commonly determined.

I find all this interesting, but not convincing. The change in the character of phenomena from age to age is the result not only of new movements in human minds and wills, but also of pressures from the unrepresented, from the real and mysterious world of things in themselves, stones of stumbling, rocks of offence. Changes in diction initiated by poets in response to new experiences are indeed changes in the world of observed and described phenomena, because our collective representations from time to time are broken in pieces by the apparition of signs and wonders, including scientific discoveries.

Mr. Barfield rightly insists that we cannot return to that original form of participation in the life of nature where men and women held conversations with the moon and the mountains, the stars and the sea. He holds that Wordsworth's attitude to nature was a survival of this. I see it as an experience that could be integrated, and in his case was, with an orthodox and indeed a rather conventional Christian belief. The mountains said to him, as they did to St. Augustine, 'We are not He, but He made us.' Mr. Barfield would have it that they add 'through your eyes'. By final participation, the goal of human progress, he means complete awareness of our part in the creation of our world. No doubt our awareness of this has been increased by modern physics and modern psychology, as well as by idealist and existential philosophies. When Mr.

Barfield writes: 'Christ is the cosmic wisdom on its way from original to final participation,' he seems to me to be teaching a doctrine of union between God and man that is different from any traditional Christian doctrine of 'deification' in that God as well as man is changed, but different from Buddhism in that personal existence has been a stage on the way of spiritual progress. It is the opposite of paganism, and a reaction from materialism in the direction of idealism, but that does not make it Christian.

Mr. Barfield writes: 'There will be a revival of Christianity when it becomes impossible to write a manual of science without referring to the incarnation of the Word,' but he seems to me to misrepresent the historical connection between the Christian faith and the scientific revolution. I should hold that belief in the evidence of our senses is historically rooted in the Jewish and Christian conviction that the world is composed of creatures, that it can therefore be examined without danger of doing violence to gods, and that man has been given a commission from the Supreme God to name the creatures in the world.[2] The claim of science to understand the real world, and to name the creatures in it, is idolatry in Mr. Barfield's vocabulary, though he allows that in the Scriptures the word is generally used in another sense, of communication between men and women and divine objects, existing in this world. Mr. Barfield has his own way of judging historical evidence, which is not that of the empiricists, or that of the historical schools. In his eyes, if miracles of healing were experienced as miracles by people who thought they were healed, the miracles happened. Nothing is to be gained by trying to find out what we should have thought if we had been there with modern knowledge and modern instruments. In this sense he believes so much that I find it difficult to believe that he believes anything in my sense of the word believing.

Mr. Ronald Hepburn in a long essay on 'Poetry and Religious Belief' in a symposium on *Metaphysical Beliefs* lately published by the S.C.M. Press, has rightly called attention to a certain tension between two problems, 'the one tractable, the other most intractable', confronting those theologians who wish to do justice to the literary character of the Old and New Testaments, and who hope in this way to help men in the modern world to understand and to believe:

> The first is the problem of presenting to the . . . reader the *meaning* of biblical concepts; to recreate for him their complex liaisons through the enormous corpus of Canonical and sometimes also non-Canonical literature. This task is very close to that of the literary critic like Caroline Spurgeon in her work on Shakespeare's imagery—providing the reader with the full weight of meaning the author put into his writing. Here the biblical theologian has been markedly successful. The second problem is not of meaning but of reference: do these images apply to the

[2] Genesis, ii, vv. 19–20.

world as it is in fact? Here his voice is much less authoritative, his study is no longer autonomous. Indeed, some of his brightest successes in his first task seem to thwart the successful advancement of his second—as when historically vital sources display patterns 'too good to be true'.

This seems to me to be well said. I should like to add certain reflections on art as historical evidence. In some respects and up to a certain point, it is very good evidence indeed, and the better the art the better the evidence. There is no better way of finding out what men really thought and how they lived, than by studying the things that they made for themselves, for their own use and pleasure, without thought for the future. Art cannot lie, and reveals more than the artist could admit into his conscious mind. In this sense verse is better evidence of an attitude than prose, and painting and sculpture may be more revealing than verse. The problem is to distinguish in a poetic or in any literary account of events (in Froissart for instance) between the setting and the historical nucleus. This problem is not peculiar to the student of the New Testament, though for him the problem is more urgent, and its answer in a particular instance more important, than it is for the editor of *The Song of Roland*.

Literature of one kind or another is, after all, a principal source of historical evidence, and historians have acquired some practice in discrimination between different kinds of literary text. From the point of view of a Logical Positivist, this may be all guess-work, since no experiment can confirm it. From the point of view of a modern empiricist, who holds that a statement 'has meaning if some sense experience is relevant to its verification', history can be enlarged, by the discovery of new evidence, or cast in doubt by conflicting testimonies. Where so much is in doubt, and the method of weighing evidence does not seem sufficiently exact, the scientist whose training has been in another discipline may hesitate to affirm any historical statement as fact. Such hesitations in regard to articles of the Christian faith stand on a different ground from the affirmation that all religious belief is of such a sort that no evidence could undermine it. This is a possible position, and one with a certain attraction for large numbers of Christians, but it is not a belief about the external world. No belief in God is that, but belief in the Christian God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, does imply recognition of acts of God in the succession of historical events.

This is one degree more fundamental than belief in the incarnation, for the idea of incarnation is not itself specifically Christian. One effect of Mr. Barfield's book is to bring out the ambiguity, even in a Christian context, of the expression, 'the incarnation of the Word'. This could be understood as the incarnation of a god, as it was by the Arians, or as the soul of the evolving world coming to consciousness in a human person, but any doctrine of the incarnation that could be called Christian,

in contrast to Hindu incarnations, implies the importance of the flesh, of history, of time. The Christian story must always be open to historical criticism.

Demythologizing and remythologizing, seen in contrast by Mr. Wren Lewis, seem to me to be two aspects of the same process of change, nor is there anything very new about this. In every age of Christian history the gospel story has been seen in a new light in a new way. In this age Freud has helped us to see the contrast between the religion of regeneration and the religions of release by his interpretation of the common human desire to escape from the wheel of birth. Without in any way intending to defend the Christian faith, he has at least shown that Christianity has more in common with fertility religion than with anti-fertility religion, as Jung has revealed the common archetypes in all the religions. Both have helped us to understand and to recreate the Christian history as myth, but the better we see the real difference between Christian and other mythology, the more clearly we shall see the point of the Christian myth is its claim to be history. If that were refuted, it would mean something else.

THE IDEA OF THE SOUL—A COMPARATIVE STUDY

By Dr. S. G. F. Brandon
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Sir Edward Tylor, who is often with justice regarded as the father of modern anthropology, found the origins of religion in what he called animism. He wrote in his classic work, *Primitive Culture*, which was first published in 1871: 'Animism is, in fact, the groundwork of the Philosophy of Religion, from that of savages up to that of civilized men. And although it may at first sight seem to afford but a bare and meagre definition of a minimum of religion, it will be found practically sufficient; for where the root is, the branches will generally be produced. It is habitually found that the theory of Animism divides into two great dogmas, forming parts of one consistent doctrine; first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body; second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank of powerful deities.'[1] The origin of the notion of 'Soul' was to be found, he believed, in the answer given by primitive man to 'two groups of biological problems. In the first place, what is it that makes the difference between a living body and a dead one; what causes waking, sleep, trance, disease, death? In the second place, what are those human shapes which appear in dreams and visions?' According to Tylor, 'the savage ancient philosophers' thought that they could distinguish two

[1] Vol. i, p. 426 (5th ed., 1913, published by John Murray, London).

essential factors in all the phenomena of being alive and being dead, namely, 'The life as enabling it (the body) to feel and think and act, the phantom as being its image or second self.' Both these entities were believed to be capable of existing apart from the body, which, however, was essentially dependent upon them. These two related concepts became united, according to Tylor, in the conception of 'an apparitional-soul, a ghost-soul'.[2]

However it may have originated, the idea of the soul has been fundamental to human thinking in all parts of the world and back into the past as far as the first vestiges of human culture in the Palaeolithic period.[3] In both current religious and popular thought the idea is still basic (some would say instinctive); but to the more fashionable philosophers it is, to say the least, very suspect, while for medical science it appears to be a source of embarrassment. Thus Professor A. J. Ayer writes:[4] 'To say that there is something imperceptible inside a man, which is his soul or his real self, and that it goes on living after he is dead, is to make a metaphysical assertion which has no more factual content than the assertion that there is a transcendent god.' And the late Sir Charles Sherrington, the distinguished physiologist, said in his *Gifford Lectures*:[5] 'It (i.e. the "non-sensual concept" or the "soul-concept") claimed to operate Nature, it claimed to include "life", an immortal soul, existences which directed whole reaches of the physical world, and a Cause which maintained, controlled, and had indeed created the universe. . . . Yet time teaches that a number of the claims themselves are in cold truth to be regarded as extravagant.'

Behind much of the current discussion of the idea of the soul there seems to lurk an assumption that the idea necessarily connotes an entity which is *sui generis* wholly different from the body and in terms of its destiny to be regarded as superior in value to the body. But the dualism implied here is in fact a distinct and peculiar version of the idea of the soul as that idea has found expression in the various religions of mankind. Accordingly, since the general witness of the belief of mankind on such an issue is of great importance, it may be useful to make a brief comparative survey of the relevant concepts which have been held among the chief religious systems.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 428–9.

[3] On the question whether the concept of the soul was known to Palaeolithic man, see P. Wernert, 'Les hommes de l'age de la pierre représentaient-ils les esprits des défunts et des ancêtres?', in *Histoire générale des Religions* (ed. M. Gorce et R. Mortier, Paris, 1948), t.i.

[4] *Language, Truth and Logic* (London, 1948, 2nd revised ed.), p. 117. Cf. G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London, 1949), pp. 11 sq.; in *The Physical Basis of Mind* (ed. P. Laslett, Oxford, 1950), pp. 75–79.

[5] *Man on his Nature* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 347. Cf. E. D. Adrian, *The Physical Basis of Perception* (Oxford, 1947), pp. 4–7, 92–5.

In this field of study primary consideration must be given to the psychological ideas of the ancient Egyptians both on the score of their antiquity and their complexity. These ideas had already an established currency in the earliest documents of Egyptian religious belief, namely, the *Pyramid Texts* (*circa* 2500 B.C.), so that they may fairly be regarded as originating at least as far back as the fourth millennium B.C., which makes them our earliest examples of human thought in this connection. Now, from these writings we find that the Egyptians already regarded human nature as constituted of a number of elements, each of which seems essential to the existence of the individual concerned. The nature and function of these various entities are difficult for us to comprehend; this situation is undoubtedly due in part to the inability of modern minds to understand properly the workings of the minds of the ancient Egyptians, but it is also probably due partly to the Egyptians' failure to define clearly the content of the relevant categories and to relate them logically to each other.

The most remarkable, and in some ways the most puzzling, of these constituents of human nature, as seen by the Egyptians, was the *ka*.[6] Perhaps the best equivalent in English for this term is the 'double'. It would seem that the Egyptians believed that at the conception of each individual a kind of double was also created. In the *bas-relief* at Luxor illustrating the birth of the pharaoh Amenhotep III, the creator-god Chnum is depicted fashioning upon his potter's wheel two infant human figures, i.e. of the king and his *ka*.[7] The *ka* was generally represented by the hieroglyphic symbol of two arms held upwards in an attitude of protective embrace; many texts indicate that the *ka* was regarded as a kind of protective genius of the individual, and there are also indications suggesting that it was originally connected with fertility and other powers essential to vitality. At death the *ka* apparently assumed a greater importance, and the tomb was often referred to as the 'house of the *ka*' and portrait-statues of the deceased were placed within it for the abode of the *ka*. That constituent of the individual person which in Egyptian psychology seems to approximate most to our idea of the soul was the *ba*, which is usually represented in Egyptian art and orthography as a human-headed bird.[8] It seems only to have manifested itself after the death of the individual; a passage from the *Pyramid Texts* suggests that the dead

[6] Cf. U. Schweitzer, *Das Werden des im Diesseits und Jenseits der alten Aegypter* (Glückstadt, 1956); L. Greven, *Der Ka in Theologie und Königskult der Aegypter des alten Reiches* (Glückstadt, 1952); H. Bonnet, *Reallexikon der aegyptischen Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1952), pp. 357-362 ('Ka').

[7] For illustrations see *Histoire générale des Religions*, t.i. p. 257; *Bilderatlas zur Religionsgeschichte* (ed. H. Haas, Leipzig, 1924), 2–4 Lieferung: 126.

[8] Cf. A. H. Gardiner, *Egyptian Grammar* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 469 (G. 53), 489 (R 7). On the *ba* see generally Bonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 74–77.

king met his *ba* in heaven.[9] The *ba* was often depicted perched on the portal of the tomb, or flying down the tomb-shaft to revisit the embalmed body in its sepulchral chamber, or as sitting upon the sarcophagus and looking at the sculptured face of its deceased owner. Certain passages in the *Coffin Texts* (*circa* 2000—1580 B.C.) suggest that the Egyptians thought of the *ba* as an entity distinct from and independent of the body[10], but it is clearly evident that they did not regard it as a spiritual entity which animated the body and which was *sui generis* immortal; as we must notice later, the preservation of the body was believed to be essential to *post-mortem* existence. We may briefly note two other important Egyptian ideas in this connection. The heart was regarded rather after the manner of the Christian 'conscience', but it was so far hypostatised that it was believed that at the *post-mortem* judgment it could stand forth as a witness against its owner; indeed it was sometimes referred to as 'the god within man'.[11] Another puzzling concept of ancient Egyptian psychology is that of the *akh*. Although this term has some curious applications, it may perhaps fairly be said that it represented the state or condition of the righteous dead, upon whose behalf all the necessary funerary rites had been performed; indeed the term in its plural form, *akhu*, seems to approximate closely to the Christian designation 'the blessed dead'.[12]

These are the chief non-corporeal elements of human nature according to the Egyptian view, but that they were all in some manner essentially associated with the body is evident from the elaborate rites of embalmment which were designed both practically and magically to preserve the body. Moreover, the essential place which the body had in Egyptian mortuary belief is eloquently attested by the curious ceremony of 'Opening the Mouth' which was performed on the mummy before it was finally buried. The ritual employed on this occasion was very similar to that used to 'animate' statues of the gods; it is quite clear that its funerary use was designed to free the embalmed body from the immobility of death, so that it could live in the tomb and receive the nourishment provided by the regular mortuary offerings.[13]

It would, accordingly, appear that the ancient Egyptians regarded man as a kind of complex psycho-physical organism, all parts of which must be properly provided for in the mortuary cultus, if a tolerable after-life was to be lived. We may especially note that they conceived of no dichotomy of body and soul, the one being by nature mortal and the other by nature

[9] *Pyr.* 763.

[10] A. de Buck, *The Egyptian Coffin Texts* (Chicago, 1947), II, Spell, 94, p. 67.

[11] Cf. Bonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–9; A. Piankoff, *Le 'Coeur' dans les Textes égyptiennes* (Paris, 1930), pp. 91–3.

[12] Cf. Bonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 4 ('Ach').

[13] Cf. Bonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 487–490 ('Mundoffnung').

immortal, a fact which is particularly significant in the present context, since this Egyptian belief is the earliest of which we have evidence.

Compared with the Egyptians, the ancient Semites (i.e. the Babylonians, Assyrians and Hebrews) had a simple conception of human nature. According to them, man was also a psycho-physical organism, being compounded essentially of a body and a kind of animating entity, the *napistu*[14] or *nephesh*.[15] Death shattered this essential union, and that which survived was a mere shadowy simulacrum of the living person, which descended to a doleful existence amid dust and darkness in *kur-nu-gi-a*[16] or Sheol. The Mesopotamians seemed to have believed that the process of death actually changed the *napistu* to a form of being known as *edimmu*, which was regarded as malevolently disposed to the living.[17] That the Hebrew conception of the *nephesh* in no way represented that of a spiritual entity, *sui generis* immortal, is evident from the fact that, when finally Yahwism was obliged to countenance belief in some effective form of an after-life, instinctively it was conceived in terms of a physical resurrection—man was a psycho-physical organism, so that, if he is to live again, he must be provided with a physical body to do so, as Ezekiel's vision of the Valley of the Dry Bones eloquently attests.[18]

If we continue to look eastwards in our quest, we may note that Iran provides a complicated problem in this respect. Almost all ancient Persian literature bears the impress of the reforming genius of Zarathustra, but in the later Mazdaism Zarathustra's contribution has become compounded with the earlier beliefs, so that it is well nigh hopeless in many instances to attempt to unravel the various strands of tradition.[19] Briefly it may be said that in Iran, before the time of Zarathustra (*circa* 570 B.C.), the dead

[14] On ancient Mesopotamian anthropology see T. Fish, 'Some Ancient Mesopotamian Traditions Concerning Man and Society', in *Bulletin of John Rylands Library*, vol. 30 (1946); G. A. Barton in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, XI, p. 749b; S. Langdon in *op. cit.*, IV, p. 444; B. Meissner, *Babylonien und Assyrien*, Band II, pp. 135, 142–6.

[15] On ancient Hebrew anthropology see A. R. Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel* (University of Wales Press, 1949); J. Pedersen, *Israel* (Copenhagen, 1926), vol. i, pp. 99–181.

[16] This was the Sumerian name, meaning 'the land of no-return', of which the Semitic form was *irṣit lâ târi;* see Messner, *op. cit.*, Bd. II, p. 143.

[17] Cf. R. C. Thompson, *The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia* (London, 1903), vol. i, pp. xxvii–xxxv; Langdon, in *op. cit.*, IV, p. 445a; Meissner, *op. cit.*, Bd. I, p. 143.

[18] *Ezek.* xxxvii, 1–14. As the answer given to those who scoff at Mohammed's doctrine of the resurrection shows (*Qu'ran*, lvi, 47), Islam follows in the ancient Semitic tradition in this respect; cf. Tor Andrae, *Mahomet: sa Vie et sa Doctrine* (Paris, 1945), pp. 57–8.

[19] Cf. J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *Zorastre* (Paris, 1948), pp. 21-3, 137 sq.; W. Eilers in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (3. Auflage, 1957), I, 797–800 ('Avesta'); A. W. Williams in *Encycl. Religion & Ethics*, II, p. 268.

(*fravashi*) were conceived as living beneath the ground and there playing a vital part in promoting fertility of man and beasts and of the fields[20] —a belief which seems to be very similar to that current in ancient China, as we shall see. Probably because of its undesirable associations, Zarathustra avoided the use of the word *fravashi* and employed instead *urvan* and *dainâ* for the non-corporeal element in man. The passage in the *Gathas* which seems to come nearest to giving us Zarathustra's view of human nature reads: 'And to him (i.e. mankind) came Dominion, Good Thought, and Right; and Piety gave continued life to their bodies and indestructibility, so that by thy retribution (i.e. Ahura Mazdah's) through the (Molten) metal he may gain the prize over these things.'[21] From this admittedly obscure passage we may reasonably infer that Zarathustra believed that in some way the individual person would survive death in order to undergo the ordeal of molten metal at the day of judgment. The fact that Piety (*Aramaiti*), one of the mysterious Amesha Spenstas, is credited with conferring this quality on mankind is significant, because *Aramaiti* appears originally to have been the genius which presided over the earth and its fecundity.[22] For this reason some authorities have thought clusion cannot be proved, it seems likely that the prophet in his eschatology drew upon some traditional belief that through the virtue of the earth the dead continued to exist, complete with their bodies. In later Iranian thought the *dainâ* came to be regarded rather as the conscience, and Persian literature contains some dramatic accounts of how the dead would encounter their conscience, in a guise fitting to their own character, after death.[24] Belief in a physical resurrection firmly established itself, and so closely was the resurrected individual related to his former physical being that it was felt necessary to detail the arrangements which would be made to deal with the fact that people died at different ages, e.g. adults were resurrected to a physical form of forty years of age, while those who had died as children were given bodies of those of fifteen years.[25] Quite clearly these curious beliefs indicate that the individual was conceived as essentially a psycho-physical organism.

Turning next to India, it will be more convenient for our purpose of comparison to leave aside for later consideration the Hindu conception

[20] Cf. Duchesne-Guillemin, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–40; W. Söderblom, *La Vie future d'après la Mazdésme* (Paris, 1901), pp. 7–9, 566–9.

[21] *Yasna* xxx, 7, trans. J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism* (Williams and Norgate, London, 1913), p. 350. Cf. Duchesne-Guillemin, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

[22] Cf. G. Dumézil, *Les dieux des Indo-européens* (Paris, 1952), pp. 17, 18.

that Zarathustra believed in a physical resurrection;[23] although this con-

[23] Cf. Moulton, *op. cit.*, pp. 163–4, 350, n.4, 378, n.7; Söderblom, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

[24] Cf. J. D. C. Pavry, *The Zoroastrian Doctrine of a Future Life* (New York, 1924), pp. 33–4, 39–45. Cf. Söderblom, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–90.

[25] *Bundahish*, xxx; trans. E. West, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. v, pp. 120 sq. Cf. Söderblom, *op. cit.*, pp. 226–236.

of the soul and to pass on to that which came to characterize Buddhism.

To the Western mind Buddhist psychology is naturally difficult to comprehend. However, it seems clear that the doctrine of the *khandhas*, i.e. the physical and spiritual constituents which make up the individual, was intended to demonstrate that there existed no soul or self behind the various activities and sensibilities which appear to constitute an individual person.[26] Buddhist thinkers could not, of course, avoid the use of the term 'self' (*atta*) or its equivalents in discoursing about human nature, but, as Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids has maintained,[27] quoting a pertinent passage: 'Whether that entity was called *satta* (being), *atta*, *jiva* (living principle) or *puggala* (person) did not matter: "For these are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. Of these he who has won truth makes use indeed, but is not led astray by them" (*Digha-N.* i, 263).' The purpose behind this denial of the existence of a substantial soul or self was that of removing the basis or cause of that illusion of individuality which was regarded as the source of all suffering.[28] Even if there is reason for thinking with Dr. H. Günther that in denying every possible definition of a soul, the Buddhist thinkers were endeavouring to preserve the truth of some deeper intuition,[29] the words attributed to the Buddha in the *Mahâvagga Sutta* (i, 6, 39-41) sufficiently attest the rejection of any conception of the soul as it is usually understood in traditional Western thought: 'Sensation (Vedanâ), O Bhikkhus, is not the self, . . . Perception (*Sannâ*) is not the self, . . . The Samkhâras are not the self, . . . Consciousness (Viññâna) is not the self, . . . '[30] Similarly the concept of *Nirvana*, despite all the recondite attempts to show that it has a positive content,[31] negates the possibility of there being any animating and sentient principle within the individual person which can continue to exist apart from the body.[32] Thus in the *Ratana Sutta*: 'They who by steadfast mind have become exempt from evil desire, and well trained in the teachings of Gautama (i.e. the Buddha); they, having obtained the fruit of the fourth Path, and immersed themselves in that ambrosia, have received without price, and are

[26] E. J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought* (London, 1951), p. 61.

[27] *Buddhist Psychology* (London, 1914), p. 32.

[28] Cf. E. Frauwallner, 'Die Anthropologie des Buddhismus (Vorbemerkung)', in *Anthropologie religieuse* (ed. C. J. Bleeker, Leiden, 1955), p. 125.

[29] *Das Seelenproblem im alteren Buddhismus* (Konstanz, 1949), p. 27.

[30] Trans. T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenburg in *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xiii (Oxford, 1881), p. 100. For other passages from Buddhist documents attesting this conclusion see M. Winternitz in *Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch* (ed. A. Bertholet, Tübingen, 1908), pp. 243–249.

[31] Cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Early Buddhism*, p. 72 (quoted by Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 128); Günther, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[32] Cf. H. Oldenburg, *Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde* (Berlin, 9th ed., 1921), p. 335.

in the enjoyment of Nirvana. Their old karma is exhausted, no new karma is being produced; their hearts are free from the longing after future life; the cause of their existence being destroyed, and no new yearning springing up within them, they, the wise, are extinguished like this lamp.'[33]

In ancient China it would appear that in the Shang period (*circa* 1523—1027 B.C.), from which the earliest written evidence comes, each individual was regarded as either possessing a *kwei* while alive or becoming one at death. The pictogram which denotes *kwei* seems to have a somewhat sinister appearance, and there is also reason for thinking that originally the Chinese conceived of the dead as having a subterranean existence, and being probably connected with fertility.[34] At a somewhat later date the dual concept of *yin* and *yang*, as the two alternating cosmic forces, seems to have become an established principle in Chinese thought, and it duly affected Chinese anthropology.[35] Accordingly, human nature came to be regarded as being compounded of the *yin* and *yang* elements, which found expression respectively in the *kwei* and the *shen*; the former was chthonic in origin and was associated with the body from the moment of conception, while the latter came from heaven, being probably derived from the phenomena of animation. However, it is certain that this dichotomy of human nature into heavenly and earthly constituents did not mean that the heavenly (i.e. the *shen*) was conceived as a kind of divine and immortal entity, which could survive the body. This issue is indeed clearly dealt with in a passage from the classic *Li Chi*, in which Confucius is represented as saying, 'To be able to make a harmony of (the two concepts), *kwei* and *shen*, is the height of philosophy. All living creatures inevitably come to die. Dying, they inevitably go back to the earth. This is what is meant by the *kwei* [? material soul]. The bones and flesh moulder below, and, hidden there, make the soil of the land. But the breath soars aloft to become light (and is found in), the fragrance and the feeling of sorrow at the sacrifice.'[36]

We may now in our survey turn back westwards the more conveniently to consider the Hindu concept of the soul. Before Indian thought found its classic expression in the *Upanishads*, it would seem that the soul was

[33] vii, 14, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (London, 1890), p. 111.

[34] Cf. M. O. H. Strange, 'Die Religion des alten China (in anthropologischer Hinsicht)', in *Anthropologie religieuse,* p. 138; J. Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China* (Cambridge, 1956), vol. ii, p. 227, No. 58; M. Granet, *La Religion des Chinois* (Paris, 1951), pp. 19–24.

[35] Cf. M. Granet, *La Pensée chinoise* (Paris, 1950), pp. 116–9, 126, 128 sq.; Fung Yu-Lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy* (Peiping, 1937), vol. i, p. 32; J. J. M. de-Groot, *Religion in China,* pp. 11–12.

[36] *Li Chi, Chi Yi,* sec. 2, trans. E. R. Hughes, *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times* (Published by J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London, 1942), pp. 278–9.

imagined as 'the person (*purusa*) of the size of a thumb' which resides in the midst of the body, probably in the region of the heart.[37] Besides this *purusa*, reference is also made to the *asu* and the *manas*; the former appears to have signified the life-principle and the latter the seat of the mind, the will and the feelings. These two entities, however, were never identified with the soul or essential self, for in the mortuary texts the invocations are never addressed to the *manas* or *asu* of the deceased, but to the person himself.[38]

The evidence of the *Upanishads* indicates that in northern India a search had long been in process to find some fundamental principle in the constitution of man which explains his diverse faculties, such as speech, sight, hearing and intellect, by providing them with some co-ordinating and purposeful centre. Experience taught that the breath (*prana*) was absolutely vital, for on its cessation the body and its faculties became lifeless and stilled. The word *atman*, which was derived from *an*, 'to breathe', and, possibly because it also connoted something more comprehensive and unifying than *prana*, became the accepted term for the soul or self, i.e. the essential being of the individual person.[39] Now this *atman* was held to be the abiding subject of the process of *samsara* (rebirth). This meant that it continued to exist through an infinite series of incarnations, which in turn meant that each individual person was regarded as compounded of two essentially different things, namely, a non-material and immortal *atman* and a mortal physical body.[40] The process of transmigration is described in one of the older *Upanishads* by means of a vivid simile: 'As a caterpillar, when it has reached the end of a blade of grass, starts off on another path and draws itself together, so does the *atman*: after it has laid aside the present body and abandoned the illusion, it starts on a new course and draws itself together' (i.e. for the purpose of assuming another body).[41]. The source or origin of the individual *atman* the Upanishadic thinkers found in the concept of a Cosmic *Atman*; in fact they actually identified the two and taught that salvation from the weary unceasing cycle of births and deaths could only be obtained by the individual *atman* realizing its essential identity with Brahman, i.e. the Cos-

[37] *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II, 1, 12 (see *The Principal Upaniṣads*, trans. S. Radhakrishnan, London, 1953), p. 634. Cf. H. Oldenburg, *Die Religion des Veda* (Berlin, u. Stuttgart, 1917), p. 525.

[38] Cf. Oldenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 525–8.

[39] Cf. S. Konow in 'Chantepie de la Saussaye', *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* (4 Auf., Tübingen, 1925), II, pp. 70–1; P. Deussen in *Encycl. Religion and Ethics*, II, p. 195 ('Etymology').

[40] E.g. *Brhad-aranyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 36.

[41] *Brhad. Up.*, IV, 4, 3, in *Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch*, p. 199 (trans. K. F. Geldner).

mic Atman, thereby breaking free from the illusion (*maya*) of being a separate individual self.[42]

In the light of what we have hitherto seen of the ideas of the soul which have been current in other cultures, this Indian concept is strikingly different. Instead of regarding the individual as essentially a psycho-physical organism, so that, if the individual as such were to have a *post-mortem* life, it would be necessary that his psychical being be in some way reconstituted, the Indian thinkers represent the body as a mere temporary abode of the soul, which is *sui generis* absolutely different from and essentially independent of any material tegument, although owing to a mysterious blindness or ignorance (*avidya*) it believes a physical body to be a reality and necessary to its existence.

From this concept of the soul as an entity intrinsically different from the body, implying, as it does, a dualistic view of human nature, we may turn to ancient Greece, where we find a similar estimate current. However, this estimate was peculiar in that it does not represent the main tradition of Greek thought in this respect, although, as we shall see, it came to exercise a very great influence upon the Christian doctrine of man.

What might be called the official Greek view of the soul finds its earliest, as well as its classic, expression in the Homeric poems. From various references and illusions in these poems, it would appear that man was regarded as a composite being comprising three distinct entities, namely, the body, the *θυμός*, and the *psyche* (*ψυχή*).[43] What the two latter terms were meant to denote is difficult to define with exactitude, since they are employed with a wide variety of reference. However, it might reasonably be said that *θυμός* represented 'mind' or 'consciousness', while the *psyche* was thought of as indwelling the individual person as a kind of life-principle. Those two entities had different destinies, for at death the *θυμός* ceased to exist and the *psyche* descended into Hades, where it became the *εἴδωλον*, the unsubstantial image of the former living person but which was bereft of any consciousness of its former state. This change is graphically described in the account of Odysseus' meeting with the shade of his mother Anticleia in Hades. The hero cries out: 'Is this but a phantom (*εἴδωλον*) that august Persephone has sent me, that I may lament and groan the more?' The shade of his mother replies: ' . . . this is the appointed way with mortals when one dies. For the sinews no longer hold the flesh and the bones together, but the strong might of the blazing fire destroys these, as soon as the life (*θυμός*) leaves the white bones, and

[42] E.g. *Chandogya Upaniṣad*, III, 14, 3. Cf. Konow in *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, II, p. 71; Deussen in *Encycl. Religion and Ethics*, II, pp. 195a–197 b.

[43] Cf. R .B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 23–40, 44–61, 66–8, 69–70, 73–4, 79–83, 93–100, 103–112, where exhaustive references are given.

the spirit (*ψυχή*), like a dream, flits away, and hovers to and fro.'[44] That this view of death as shattering irreparably the psycho-physical organism which had been the living human person, so that nothing significant remained, was not just a piece of poetical imagery is evident from the inscription which publicly commemorated the Athenian soldiers, who fell at the battle of Potidaea in 432 B.C.: 'The air has received their souls (*ψυχὰς*), the earth their bodies. By the gates of Potidaea they were slain.'[45]

That belief of a more primitive character, which envisaged the dead as in some way continuing to live either in the tombs or beneath the ground, lingered on in the popular mind is indicated by the hero-cult, the Anthesteria festival and the Eleusinian mysteries; but what is more significant from the point of view of our survey is the idea of the soul which apparently emerged in Orphic circles and which became so notably elaborated in Platonic philosophy. Already it appears that the idea of metempsychosis, or the transmigration of the soul, was an important part of Pythagorean doctrine.[46] Whether the idea was the invention of the Pythagoreans or had been derived by them from some extraneous source, possibly Indian, has not been established, but it implied a concept of the soul as a pre-existent and immortal entity which passed through a succession of incarnations. Whatever the origins of this doctrine, it is clear that in certain circles of Greek society it became very influential. Thus Plato in his dialogue *Cratylus* writes: 'Some say that the body (*sôma*) is the tomb (*sêma*) of the soul (*τῆς ψυχῆς*), as if the soul in this present life were buried; and again, it is well named *sôma* because it is the instrument by which the soul indicates (*sêmainei*) its meaning. But I think it most likely that the name was given by the followers of Orpheus, with the idea that the soul is undergoing whatever penalty it has incurred, and is enclosed in the body, as in a sort of prison-house, for safe-keeping. So the body is the place of safe-keeping (*sôma*) of the soul until the penalty it owes is discharged, and not even a letter of the name it bears need be changed.'[47]

In the teaching of Socrates and Plato (their several teachings on this point cannot be disentangled) the idea of the soul's divine origin and its immortal nature finds its classic expression. The *Phaedo* is devoted to

[44] *Odyssey*, XI, 204–222, trans. A. T. Murray, Loeb Classical Library ed. (published by W. Heinemann Ltd., London, 1919), vol. i, pp. 401–3.

[45] *C.I.A.*, I, p. 442. Cf. J. Burnet in *Encycl. Religion and Ethics*, XI, p. 741a, n.l.; F. M. Cornford, *Greek Religious Thought from Homer to the Age of Alexander* (London, 1923), pp. 235. See E. Rohde's comment on the evidence of epitaphs on private graves, *Psyche* (Freiburg, 1898), II, pp. 379–380.

[46] Cf. Diogenes Laertius, viii, 25, in Cornford, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–8. See also L. Robin, *La Pensée grecque* (Paris, 1928), pp. 79–84.

[47] *Cratylus*, 400B; translated by F. M. Cornford, *Greek Religious Thought from Homer to the Age of Alexander* (published by J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London, 1923), p. 74.

proving the soul's immortality, and in the *Phaedrus* a complete doctrine of Man is attempted, in which the influence of Orphism is patent. In this latter dialogue the soul is depicted as pre-existent and by nature immortal and divine. An explanation is given of the fact that some souls cannot maintain their original elevation and sink down until they find a solid resting-place, i.e. a body. This starts a process of incarnations variously in human and animal bodies, whence results much contamination of the soul, for which atonement has to be made.[48]

It was the influence of this Orpheo-Platonic doctrine of the soul with which St. Paul had to contend in his exposition of Christianity in an Hellenic *milieu*, and his writings witness to the difficulties in which he became involved as he sought to reconcile this doctrine with that very different tradition which he inherited from his native Judaism.

So far as the teaching of the original Jewish Christians of Palestine in this respect can be distinguished from the accretions with which it is overlaid in the later Gospels, it would appear that the traditional Semitic view of man was held, namely, as being a psycho-physical organism.[49] These Jewish Christians accepted, moreover, the Pharisaic belief in a resurrection of the dead, which, as we have seen, was a logical necessity, if a *post-mortem* life was envisaged.[50] That Paul shared this view is evident from the assurance which he gave to his converts at Thessalonica about the fate of those Christians who had already died before the Second Coming of Christ. He tells them that 'the dead in Christ shall arise first; then we that are alive, that are left, shall together with them be caught up in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air . . . '[51] The imagery is essentially materialistic; both the resurrected dead and the living enter into the *Parousia*-state complete with their physical bodies. However, later at Corinth it appears that Paul encountered the objections of certain Greek converts who were familiar with the Orpheo-Platonic concept of the soul as an etherial entity which in this life is imprisoned in the gross body and which is emancipated therefrom at death. To those brought up in this tradition the doctrine of a physical resurrection was abhorrent, for it contradicted their belief that the soul could only live its proper life when freed from its corrupting prison.[52] Hence Paul had to face the question:

[48] *Phaedrus*, 245–250. Cf. Robin, *op. cit.*, pp. 244–6; W. R. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (London, 1935), pp. 156–168. In this connection it should be noted that Gnosticism must be evaluated as a soteriology of universal significance; see G. Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion* (Zurich, 1951).

[49] Cf. H. W. Robinson in *Encycl. Religion and Ethics*, XI, p.733b.

[50] E.g. *Mark* xii, 18–27; *Luke*, xxiv, 37–43; *Acts*, xxiii, 6–8.

[51] I *Thess.* iv, 13–18.

[52] See Dr. Gilbert Murray's description of the Primitive Christians as those who 'turned the Immortality of the Soul into "the standing up of the corpses" ', *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 165.

'How are the dead raised and with what manner of body do they come?'[53] He seems to have appreciated the point of the objection and he attempted to meet it by a compromise, howbeit at the expense of logic and strict loyalty to his Jewish heritage. Accordingly, by a reprehensibly elusive play on the words 'body' (σῶμα) and 'flesh' (σὰρξ), designed to demonstrate that every form of being has some corporeal vehicle, he endeavours to show that the *post-mortem* life will entail the use of a body and that this is provided for by the burying of the physical body after the manner in which seed-corn is buried.[54] In a later letter to the Corinthian Christians, the Apostle appears to have moved decisively further in the adoption of Hellenistic categories. In II *Cor.* v, 1-4, he is found thinking now in terms of an inner essential self which in this world has to dwell in what he describes as 'the earthly house (ἡ ἐπίγειος . . . . οἰκία) of our tabernacle (τοῦ σκήνους)'. Both the epithets 'earthly' and 'tabernacle', which are used here, convey the idea of a temporary abode, and this is confirmed by the following statement that, on the dissolution of this 'earthly house', 'we have the building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens'. And he continues in terms very reminiscent of Orpheo-Platonic thought: 'For verily in this (house) we groan, longing to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven: if so being clothed we shall not be found naked. For indeed we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that we should be unclothed, but that we should be clothed upon, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life.' In this obscure statement Paul seems to be assuming that each individual has an enduring essential self, which he is content to describe by the first person plural of the personal pronoun; but this self apparently would be naked unless it indwells a physical body or is clothed upon by the eternal 'house', which is already prepared in the heavens. Paul's meaning here, however, is unfortunately still further obscured by the fact that a little before this particular passage he had written in a somewhat similar vein: 'Wherefore we faint not; but though our outward man is decaying, yet our inward man is renewed day by day.'[55] Here it would surely seem that the Apostle was contemplating a synchronous process whereby, as with advancing age the physical body gradually weakens towards its final disintegration, the inner essential self, which Plato would have called the *psyche*, was correspondingly growing or maintaining its vitality by the mysterious action of which he called daily ἀνακαινοῦται.

In his vocabulary Paul generally employs those terms which were current in Jewish Christian circles and which were the Greek equivalents of the Hebrew words traditionally used to describe the constituent parts of the individual person. There is, however, one notable exception, namely,

[53] I *Cor.*, xv, 35.
[54] I *Cor.*, xv, 36–44.
[55] II *Cor.*, iv, 16.

Paul's differentation of *psyche* and *pneuma* in the adjectival forms of these words which he used to qualify the two kinds of body which appertain to man. Thus *sôma psychikon* is the natural body of a person living in this material world, whereas *sôma pneumatikon* is the etherial form of manifestation, with which conception Paul endeavoured to remove the Greek objection to a physical resurrection.[56] How Paul would have defined more exactly the difference which he assumes between *psyche* and *pneuma* is, of course, not known, but the contradistinction which his use of them in opposition implies, together with the prayer in I *Thess.* v, 23 ('may your *pneuma* and *psyche* be preserved entire'), has served to sanction that trichotomy of the individual human being into body, soul and spirit, which has become so familiar a feature of subsequent Christian thought.

From our survey it would accordingly appear that the conceptions of the soul which have been current in the great religious systems of mankind divide themselves into two kinds. The more general may be described as that which regards the soul as essentially united to the body to make up an organic whole, which is the individual person. This conception may be fairly regarded as the more natural one, since it is more in keeping with man's experience of himself and his fellow-beings. According to the other conception, which occurs in Indian and in Orpheo-Platonic thought, the soul is a pre-existent immortal entity of divine origin, which is essentially different from any body which it may happen to indwell. The Christian idea of soul, seen in this comparative context, appears as a kind of illogical compromise between these two different types of concept. But to the eye of faith it may perhaps rather seem an inspired attempt to combine the truths implicit in the two different cultural traditions of Israel and Hellas—an attempt which has proved itself pragmatically by providing the basis of that dynamic *Weltanschauung* which in the course of history has contrasted so notably with the pessimistic estimate of human destiny which has stemmed from the Indian doctrine of man.

[56] I *Cor.*, xv, 44.

JOB IN THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS TIME*

By Rev. J. N. Schofield, Lecturer in Old Testament in the Univesrity of Cambridge

> Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom;
> And to depart from evil is understanding.
>
> Job xxviii, 28

The words provide an indication of the authorship, and so of the meaning, of one of the most fascinating books in the Old Testament. They were the motto of a group of writers known as the Wise Men, who were Middlemen trying to close the ever-widening gap between organized religion with its priestly ritual and prophetic vision on the one side and the ordinary thinking man outside. To a much greater extent than us, some of them broke free from traditional ecclesiastical ceremonies, thought-forms, and language in order to commend their God to men and women in the Hellenistic age, an age which had much in common with what we loosely call scientific thought; sometimes they were very critical of stereotyped ideas in contemporaneous religion. They were practical teachers with an intimate knowledge of human life, in living contact with ordinary people and with the power to express sensible counsel in forcible language. Their aim was to help folk to live happy, healthy, moral and prosperous lives, and their teaching has been summed up as 'consecrated commonsense in everyday life'. One of them wrote,[1] 'He that devotes himself to the law is filled therewith, but the profane man stumbles thereat'; some men can be started on their religious pilgrimage with the Bible and the Church, others have not the background that enables them to accept orthodox religious presuppositions, and the wise men found common ground with these people in experience. They taught that life's highest good was wisdom or understanding; that the primary element in wisdom, and the road that led to it, was a reverent attitude toward the creator and sustainer of the universe, and a deliberate turning away from all we know to be wrong—Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding.

In the Old Testament their work is found mainly in three books: 'a handbook of practical religion' expounding the sensible way to live; Ecclesiastes, which faces the disillusionments of life, and attempts to assess the value of those aims for which most of us live; and Job, whose author has been driven deeper than the other two books by the experience of calamity, intense suffering, and the loss of loved ones. It is to this last book that I invite your attention.

The book of Job has usually been regarded as a wonderful but completely unsatisfactory work. Recently a scholar wrote, 'apart from airing

*The text of a sermon delivered before the University of Cambridge, January 19th, 1958.

[1]Ecclesus xxxii, 15.

the problem, the debate proves comparatively fruitless, and God himself is finally introduced to remind Job that, just as the wonders of the physical world leave man with much that he cannot understand, so he must not expect to find a complete answer to so urgent and personal a problem as that of unmerited suffering'.[2] But when we recognize that the book belongs to the Jewish Wisdom literature, we shall not expect to find in it theories about the meaning of calamity and loss, nor the reason why the innocent suffer in a world governed by a loving, almighty God, but the much more practical and existentialist discussion of the wise man's attitude to such suffering when it becomes a fact of experience for him or his nation.

Job is depicted as a wise man who feared God and eschewed evil. His wisdom had paid excellent dividends; he was blessed with seven sons and three daughters and was the wealthiest and most respected man in the Near East. Suddenly the blows of misfortune fall on him. War, lightning, and tempest rob him of his wealth and bereave him of his children. With dramatic vividness one messenger follows another in rapid succession announcing disasters, and Job mourns his children, worships the Lord, and says, 'Naked came I from my mother's womb, naked I return thither: the Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of the Lord.' But his misfortunes were not ended. The health, which another wise man said was better than fine gold, is taken from him and, alone on the city ash-heap, he scrapes his suppurating flesh. Yet still his reverence for God is not shaken; there is no complaint, no seeking to understand why it all happened; just a simple faith that accepts life's experiences as coming from the hand of God, 'Shall we receive good at the hand of God and not receive evil?'

In the book, with fine dramatic skill, the writer interposes two other scenes in this first act or prologue. Unknown to Job, before each of his great misfortunes we are shown the Divine throne room where the servants of God are presenting themselves, and among them is the Rover, the Satan, who goes to and fro in the earth, and walks up and down in it that he may make his report, adversely, on what he sees. In these scenes there is humour in the description of the Satan and in God's proud question which starts all the trouble, 'Have you considered my servant Job?' There is a challenge, that God cannot fail to accept, in the Satan's sneer, voicing a common attitude to religion, 'Doth Job reverence God for nought?' And before the curtain rises each time on the scene of Job's desolation we watch, in another scene, the Satan go out from the presence of the Lord to take away successively all Job's possessions and his health.

The second act in the drama shows the arrival of Job's three friends

[2] *The Bible To-day*. The Time Symposium, 1955 Essay by A. R. Johnson, p. 48.

to comfort him, with rent mantles, dust on their heads, weeping; they sat down with him upon the ground seven days and seven nights, and none spake a word to him: for they saw that his pain was very great. That was more than even Job could endure. Suddenly the patient sufferer becomes the impatient rebel and in exaggerated language, that Dean Swift used to recite on his own birthday, Job cursed the day on which he was born:

> Let the day perish wherein I was born.
> And the night which said, There is a man child conceived.
> Let that day be darkness;
> Let not God enquire after it from above.
> Why died I not from the womb?

From the sequel it is clear that what caused the outburst was the knowledge that his religious friends doubted his integrity. Accepting the orthodox religious dogma that rewards and punishments automatically followed goodness and sin they were sure that, despite all appearances, Job was being punished for sin. It was the friends who caused Job's deepest suffering, the spiritual agony. The writer believed there was something wrong with the teaching of the Church of Israel when it produced in Job such an outburst, forced him to become self-centred and made him try to justify himself. If the Church was to help suffering humanity, it must change completely its attitude to the experience of suffering. The tension between Job and his friends is shown in three cycles of speeches, in each of which there is a speech by each of his friends and Job's reply. It is clear that none of his friends speaks from experience. Eliphaz, the most kindly and gracious of the three, claims to have had a special revelation:

> A thing was brought me by stealth
> Mine ear received a whisper.
> Fear came on me and trembling,
> That made all my bones shake.
> A breath passed over my face,
> The hair of my flesh stood up.
> It stood still but I could not discern its appearance;
> A form was before my eyes:
> In the silence I heard a voice.

Categorically he states that no man can be just before God, the innocent never perish, men reap what they sow. Reproving Job for his impatient outburst, he says:

> As for me, I would seek unto God,
> And unto God would I commit my cause.
> Happy is the man whom God reproveth,
> Therefore despise not the chastening of the Almighty.

Job's reply is a pathetic plea for mercy to the pitiless God who will not even kill him to save him suffering:

> Oh that I might have my request;
> And that God would grant the thing I long for!
> Even that it might please God to crush me;
> That he would loose his hand, and cut me off!
> Then should I yet have comfort.

Job's outburst shocks Bildad, the second friend, who is more dogmatic and emphatic than Eliphaz. His knowledge is based on the traditions of the past:

> Enquire, I pray thee, of the former age,
> Apply thyself to that which thy fathers have searched out.
> Doth God pervert judgement?
> Or the Almighty pervert justice?
> If thy children sinned against him,
> He hath delivered them into the power of their sin.
> If thou wouldst seek diligently unto God,
> And make thy supplication to the Almighty;
> If thou wert pure and upright,
> Surely He would awake for thee,
> And make thy righteous habitation prosperous.

Job claims that such a God is cruel and terrifying:

> He breaks me with a tempest,
> And multiplies my wounds without cause.
> If the scourge slay suddenly
> He mocks at the calamity of the innocent.

And Job turns to God and cries:

> Thy hands have framed me and fashioned me
> Together round about; yet thou dost destroy me.

God had created him, knows and foresees all, and must have made him for the brutal pleasure of torturing and destroying him.

> If I wash myself with snow
> And cleanse my hands with lye;
> Yet wilt thou plunge me in the ditch,
> And my own clothes shall abhor me.
> For he is not a man, as I am, that I should answer him,
> That we should come together in judgement.
> There is no umpire between us
> That might lay his hand upon us both.
> Let him take his rod away from me,
> And let not his terror make me afraid:
> Then would I speak and not fear him.

Zophar, the most dogmatic of the three, picks up Job's plea that he might speak with God:

> Oh that God would speak,
> And open his lips against thee;
> Know therefore that God forgetteth most of thine iniquities
> Canst thou find out the depths of God,
> Or search to the end the Almighty?

If Job will repent, God will forgive him and no one will make him afraid. Zophar needed neither a special revelation nor traditions of the past; he was his own oracle and knew everything.

> Then Job answered and said,
> No doubt ye are the people,
> And wisdom shall die with you,
> But I too have understanding:
> And I am not inferior to you.

He turns from his friends—'forgers of lies and physicians of no value'—to the two conflicting facts of his own experience; on the one side:

> The just, the perfect man is a laughing stock
> The tents of robbers prosper,
> And they that provoke God are secure.

and on the other, all nature seem to teach that there is a Creator

> In whose hand is the soul of every living thing,
> And the breath of all mankind.

Knowing his own innocence, he pleads with God to speak to him before death swallows him up; as a soldier waits patiently for his relief, however long his period of duty, so he would endure.

> Oh that thou wouldst hide me in the grave,
> That thou wouldst keep me secret, till thy wrath is past,
> That thou wouldst appoint me a set time, and remember me!
> Thou shouldst call, and I would answer thee;
> Thou wouldst have a desire toward the one thou hast made.

In the second cycle of speeches, the friends have given up hope of making Job repent. They rebuke him for his conceit and self-righteousness, paint in vivid language the fate of the wicked and the brevity of his triumph; once again Job breaks down in bitter complaint against the God who has leapt on him like a wild beast or a powerful bully:

> I was at ease and he broke me asunder;
> He took me by the neck and dashed me to pieces:
> He has set me up as a target to shoot at.
> Although there is no violence in my hands,
> And my prayer is pure.

But Job believed that when he died his innocent blood would cry for vengeance, but to whom? Will the killer become the avenger? No other hand but God's could have sent the sufferings, but by his very nature God must vindicate innocent blood, and Job cries out:

> I know that my avenger (redeemer) liveth,
> Whom I shall see for myself,
> And mine eyes shall behold.

Whatever rigid, religious theory may say, the wise man does not abandon either of the two seemingly conflicting facts of experience; there is an almost defiant assertion that wicked men do prosper and innocent ones suffer, and yet God avenges his slaughtered saints. Contrary to the dogmas of his friends, both facts must be a revelation of the God for whom he is searching; however fearful of God he may be, he will not make his judgment blind nor be forced into pretence:

> Till I die I will not put away my integrity from me,
> My righteousness I will hold fast and will not let it go.

In the third and final cycle of speeches, there is confusion as to where the speeches end and Job's replies begin, almost as though the author preferred to let the curtain go up and down as Zophar repeats the wearisome statement of his orthodox beliefs.

Then, when finally the curtain comes down at the end of the speeches, a narrator comes on to the stage in front of the curtain, posing the question that has been forming in the mind of every listener:

> Where shall wisdom be found,
> And where is the place of understanding?
> Man knoweth not the price thereof;
> Neither is it found in the land of the living.
> God understandeth the way thereof,
> And he knoweth the place thereof.
> For he looketh to the ends of the earth,
> And seeth under the whole heaven.
> But unto man he said,
> Behold reverence for the Lord, that is wisdom;
> And to depart from evil is understanding.

This soliloquy, like the prologue, is hidden from Job, who in his new search for wisdom and for God has turned back to his own experience for his data, and when the curtain goes up for the final act, he paints in vivid contrasts the picture of happy days, before the curse of God fell on him, and the miseries of the present, and makes his last wonderful confession of innocence, ending with his final plea:

> Oh, that I had one to hear me!
> Lo, here is my mark, let the Almighty answer me,
> And the indictment which mine adversary hath written.

Then quite unexpectedly a fourth, much younger friend, Elihu, is introduced to show what an old Hebrew prophet would have said. The three friends had ceased to answer Job because he was righteous in his own eyes, and they failed to realize that their own attitude had made him self-righteous; but Elihu's anger is kindled against Job because he justified himself:

> For he addeth rebellion unto his sin,
> He clappeth his hands amongst us,
> And multiplieth his words against God.

Elihu claims to speak as one of the old prophets and pleads with Job to cease to be self-centred and self-righteous; he claims that release from suffering will not come through the confession or self-examination demanded by the other friends, but through that humility in the presence of God which had been the third element in the great prophetic definition of religion—acts of justice, an attitude of loving-kindness, and walking humbly step by step with God. Job, as well as his friends, needs a new vision of God that they may cease to be self-centred; and suddenly God speaks. As in the ancient days, he had come on the wings of the storm to rescue his people so, out of the storm, he speaks to Job and takes him out into 'the picture gallery of his world'. The sight of the greatness of God's power and his unsearchable wisdom makes Job cry:

> I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear,
> And now mine eye seeth thee.
> Wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes.

Job had learned the wise man's secret, the true meaning of religion; self-surrender in reverence to God; living in the presence of one who is greater than ourselves.

The prose epilogue has been regarded as out of keeping with the spiritual heights of the poem and as unnecessary. It is as unnecessary and out of keeping as the bodily resurrection of Jesus. Both are concrete ways of expressing God's approval and vindication. The friends of Job had to offer their sacrifice to the Lord, go to Job and ask him to pray for them because God accepted Job; to pray for them that God would not deal with them according to their folly. And when Job had prayed for his friends, who had despitefully used him, and was purged from all bitterness, God restored the fortunes of Job and his sufferings ceased.

REVIEWS

THE SELF AND GOD*

I confess with regret that this is the first writing by the Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow that I have read—with regret, because I have seldom read anything better. There is not a great deal that is new in it; but the value of so much that has been written on its fundamental subject-matter is so often reduced by obscurity, and in this book it is set forth with a rare combination of sanity and clarity. Anyone whose reading has been wide will recognize at once how much greater is the author's own reading than his references to other books explicitly indicate; but he has digested and pondered it until he is able to write in a style which is simple, direct, lucid, and marked by a distinctive freshness that is all his own. No one who has been at all seriously concerned with issues fundamental to the truth of religion should find any difficulty in following nearly all its reasoning. Among the Gifford Lectures I have read I should place it, as delightful reading, only slightly second to those entitled *The Human Situation* by the late Professor Macneile Dixon.

Only the widely prevailing attitude of mind, which is psychologically rather than rationally or reasonably induced, could explain a failure to recognize the importance of this book. No estimate of the meaning and purpose of human existence, including the view that it has none, is possible without faith, since none is capable of proof. But far too many present-day theologians write as though religion can be reasonably established by expounding 'Biblical theology' with little more than minimal attention to the question of its truth. It must be accepted by faith. This 'faith' is said to be 'the response of the whole personality', a phrase which can easily dignify credulity, and no less when its loftiness of sound but not its meaning is increased by adding that the response must be 'in depth'; or else faith is said to be 'a Divine gift', in some other sense than that it is an activity of God-given personality, which not only also offers a shelter for credulity but sets up the inexplicable and superfluous mystery as to why the alleged Divine gift is distributed with such parsimonious economy and so widely withheld. And in either case, this 'faith' is written about in a way which suggests that it is almost entirely independent of and superior to all naturally acquired knowledge or profitable beliefs.

For instance, nothing is more common than the reminder that the Christian doctrine of immortality is not the Greek notion of the soul's survival of bodily death, but the preservation and the fulfilment of the whole personality, safeguarded by the words 'the resurrection of the body'. This is true enough; but it needs to be added that all natural knowledge tends so heavily against the notion of a literal resurrection of the body (and if it is not literal then 'resurrection' is deprived of its natural meaning) as, for most minds, to make it inconceivable and therefore incredible. A doctrine of the spiritual reality and relative independence of the self or soul does not, of course, prove anything about its immortality; but, apart from it, any doctrine of life after death depends upon sheer miracle, unsupported except by New Testament texts regarded as Divine revelation of information on matters such as theologians nowadays usually affirm that it is not the purpose of the New Testament to afford. Every dabbler in psychology pours scorn on the idea of the soul as being no more than a superfluous and erroneous form of speech; and theologians often admit the validity of arguments against the actuality of the soul and overlook the fact that any such argu-

**On Selfhood and Godhood*, by C. A. Campbell. The Gifford Lectures, 1953–54, and 1954–55, revised and expanded. (London: George Allen & Unwin. New York The Macmillan Company. Pp. 433. Price 35/- net.)

ment, if its validity is allowed, is no less valid against the actuality of God. *'Theology* without a soul', says Prof. Campbell,

> 'would seem to amount to something like a contradiction in terms. If talk about the soul be forbidden to the theologian, he might as well retire from business altogether. The questions he is most interested in asking—let alone the answers to them—just don't make sense'.

Hence his first course of ten lectures, half the book, is devoted to a sustained defence of the self as

> 'a unitary and relatively enduring subject, a being not reducible *to* experiences, but manifesting itself *in* experiences; a being in which . . . spirit and body are intermingled, and "compose a certain unity", yet a being of which the essence is spiritual, in the sense that while we can conceive its existence as possible without *body,* we can attach no meaning at all to its existence without *spirit*'.

The difficulty here is that what we can *conceive* as possible without a body we cannot *imaginatively picture* without a body; and it is what can be thus pictured which so largely determines what multitudes are able to believe. So the author wisely adds that the self is

> 'a being that is for itself, in the last resort, a *mystery;* knowing in some measure, indeed, *what* it is, but knowing not at all *how* it is what it is'.

This conclusion is reached after a study of cognition in which Professor Campbell develops the idealist tradition of the supreme importance in the act of judgement involved in all cognition, and what is thereby implied; self-consciousness, self-identity and personal identity are next examined; then the relation of the self to its body, the empirical status of self-knowledge gained by introspection; dispositions (i.e., the fact that past experiences are retained for future use) and how this power can be accounted for; the reality of the experience of self-activity (from which the notion of activity in general is derived) in its various forms; the free-will problem; and finally the implications of moral experience. I find it hard to say that any of these themes are better handled than others, since all are illumined, and the reasoning is so condensed that short-space summaries of it would inevitably mislead. I can only say that I think Prof. Campbell is never better than when writing on moral experience, and that this is partly due to his sustained refusal to accept talk about the language which attempts to describe moral experience as a substitute for the actual experience.

But a few words must be said about the two chapters which preface the study thus so inadequately indicated. These make clear and defend the author's standpoint about the place of reason in religion, natural or revealed. He is not mainly concerned to refute the type of empiricism lately called logical positivism, or the analysis of language ('linguisticism' as he calls it) to which modern philosophers are so largely given, except as these directly threaten the legitimacy of his own procedures; but in many places in the book these modern substitutes for metaphysics receive shrewd blows. Nor is Prof. Campbell a rationalist defending the omnicompetence of reason; he does not claim that it is able to apprehend God as an 'object' of reason. But he does insist that no *proposition,* 'no matter whence it springs, has in the end a valid title to acceptance except in so far as it approves itself to reason'. Here he seems to me to be incontestably right, and if he is not, discussion is useless. The causes of belief and conviction are various; but *causes* of belief (unless they are also reasons) neither necessarily nor indeed usually afford any guarantee that *what* thus comes to be believed and expressed is either true or false. To say 'This statement is true' is to utter literal *non*sense unless the explicit also contains an implied one, the implied affirmation being that it is known to be true or that there are good grounds for

believing it to be true. That this is so should be self-evident from the simple fact that no one in his senses would say 'This proposition is true, but I have no reasons or grounds for knowing or believing it to be true'. Prof. Campbell put it thus: The religious critic may

> 'simply *assert* that not reason, but Authority, or the Inner Light, or what you will, is the ultimate arbiter: but as soon as he commits himself to *defending* the proposition, to arguing in its support, he presupposes the truth of the very proposition he is aiming to disprove. 'Argument' has no meaning if it does not invite decision in accordance with the evidence as it approves itself to *reason*'.

Though Prof. Campbell has only three references to volume I of the late Dr. Tennant's *Philosophical Theology* (the first of them is wrongly given in his index as on p. 12; it should be p. 72), and though his philosophical position and procedure are very different from Tennant's approach by way of empirical genetic and analytic psychology, there is a remarkable agreement in their conclusions about the status of the enduring self or soul and its activities—so much so that they reinforce each other.

The theme of the second course of ten lectures is 'Is religion true?' Of course some definition of religion is a condition prior to its discussion. Prof. Campbell argues that elements of emotion and elements of belief are essential, that the object of religion must be worshipful, which itself requires that the object must be of supernatural status and therefore mysterious, and of transcendent power and value. The second lecture begins with a similar definition of religion 'in its basic form as experience' as

> 'a state of mind comprising belief in the reality of a supernatural being or beings endued with transcendent power and worth, together with the complex emotive attitude of worship intrinsically appropriate thereto'.

The author then deals with the criticisms that can be made of this, as of all definitions of religion, as being either too broad or too narrow. But for educated persons in the community to which we belong, the question 'Is religion true?' boils down to 'Is Theism true?' Theism is defined as

> 'belief in one God, perfect in Power, Wisdom and Goodness, an Infinite and Eternal Spirit Who is the ground of all that is, Who is the Moral Governor of the World, and Who is yet a living presence in the hearts of men'.

The remaining lectures are devoted to considering what philosophy can achieve in support of theism so defined and in answer to the major objections which can be brought against it. Rational theism is rejected because held to be inconsistent with itself. There is a penetrating discussion of the problem of evil in both its forms—of sin or moral evil, and of undeserved suffering. Prof. Campbell is, as I judge, right in thinking the former to be a far less formidable difficulty than the latter; nevertheless he concludes that theism is

> 'not inconsistent with the existence of evil in either form; though hard put to it, without enlisting the postulate of immortality, to maintain itself in the face of certain facts of undeserved suffering of a prolonged and intense character'.

And he holds a future life is a real possibility.

The Gifford Lectures are concerned with natural theology, and it would be unreasonable to complain, though one may regret, that Prof. Campbell is precluded from giving his estimate of the value of what Christian theology can contribute towards a fuller understanding of the perplexities of this dark theme.

But about the sinfulness of human nature he has much to say that is very much more sound than most modern theological discussion of it. I should say that there is a sense in which words about having 'no power of ourselves to help ourselves' can be

defended—*viz.*, that such power as we have is God-given and therefore not ultimately 'of ourselves'; but if it is given, we have it; and the notion that it has been wholly lost or withdrawn is only possible for those who think the issue can be determined on the basis of doubtful exegesis of biblical texts to the exclusion of actual moral experience. As Prof. Campbell says, if man has any power to accept rather than to reject Grace, this cannot be other (if he does so choose) than a manifestation of man's will to good, which is fatal to the doctrine of total depravity. It is, I fear, safe to predict, in the prevailing theological climate, that the wise things this author has to say on this subject, and also in Appendix C on spiritual pride, will remain unanswered and ignored. ,

The theism defended in these lectures is called supra-rational. It follows that statements about God must be symbolic theology. For Prof. Campbell, though he is by no means uncritical of it, Rudolf Otto's *Das Heilige,* (*The Idea of the Holy* in its English translation), is of great importance, and he regards its author as 'by a wide margin, the most illuminating thinker of modern times'. It is a large claim, the more so as he rejects Otto's claim that the capacity for numinous consciousness is an ultimate mode of human experience and an *a priori* category. I am disinclined to offer unreasoned criticisms of so carefully reasoned arguments, but I think that the heavy reliance upon Otto is the most vulnerable section of this book. I think there is more in Dr. John Oman's criticisms of Otto than Prof. Campbell answers, and I wonder if he considered the appendix on *The Idea of the Holy* in Streeter's Bampton Lectures. There is too much of the *non*-rational in Otto's book to make it of basic importance for a supra-rational theism.

The finite mind being incompetent to frame a concept of the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of God, we must humbly recognize that the attributes of the Creator are in the last resort a mystery to the creature. There is both justification and need for Prof. Campbell's criticism that for most theologians recognition of the mystery of the Godhead has very little effect on their theology:

> 'Lip-service having been duly paid to it, they seem to feel themselves absolved from any further theoretical obligations in the matter. They proceed forthwith to debate refinements of theological doctrines which seem plainly to imply the concepts in their literal meaning. . . . Yet if it once be conceded that these concepts are applicable to God only "with a difference", it is surely imperative to establish that this "difference" is at least not so radical that the doctrines employing these concepts completely lose their old sense—and perhaps even gain no new one.'

As in so much else, Prof. Campbell is illuminating in his attempt to grapple with this difficulty. I think he succeeds in arguing that his form of Symbolic Theology avoids the accusation of agnosticism often brought against other forms of it, though in this matter readers not familiar with philosophical theology will find him harder to follow and will see little difference between his doctrine and the famous one of Analogy. In the result, he concludes that philosophy can corroborate his definition of theism, with the one exception that God is a living presence in the hearts of men. He is fully aware that for most religious faith this is of the essence of religion and, though he states the difficulties involved in asserting it, admits that nothing in his philosophical theory directly contradicts it. Recurring to his definition of Theism (quoted above) I should say that if God 'is an Infinite and Eternal Spirit Who is the ground of all that is', he must in some sense be a living presence in the hearts of men; and if he is not, and these words be omitted from the definition of Theism, it would be more correctly described as a definition of Deism.

J. S. Bezzant

WHAT IS MAN?*

So much of modern scientific thinking has been concerned with relating man to his natural environment and with stressing his kinship to other forms of animal life that it is refreshing to come upon a well reasoned presentation of the ways in which man differs from the animals. In the light of the history of Western thought it is understandable, when reaction came to the man-centred *Weltanschauung* of mediaeval culture, and especially when that reaction was inspired by the newly awakened scientific interest in the natural world, that every effort should have been made to integrate man with his environment; this process, moreover, was greatly facilitated by the theory of the gradual evolution of the natural species from simpler beginnings, since mankind could then be assigned a credible animal ancestry. But the movement may now fairly be regarded as having gone beyond the point of re-addressing the balance, and there seems now to be a real danger of denying or neglecting those aspects of human nature, of which the significance is essential for any proper evaluation of man and his destiny. It is then a truly important task that Mr. Leslie Paul sets himself in his new book, and it may be said that he accomplishes it with great skill and has thereby made a valuable contribution to the philosophy of religion.

Mr. Paul has evidently chosen his title with considerable care, for it succinctly denotes the process which he regards as crucial in the evolution of man. Aristotle called man a 'political animal', others since have characterized him as a 'technical animal'; Mr. Paul is here concerned to present him as 'an historical animal, with a deep sense of his own past'. The definition is an apt one, because the possession of a sense of history connotes the possession of a set of faculties which do not appear to be shared by the other animals. In becoming an 'historical animal' man acquired that sense of time which lifts him out of immersion in present experience in which all other forms of life apparently live. Thereby he becomes self-conscious and able to differentiate himself and his own kind from all other species who live 'unconsciously' or instinctively. Hence stems also the beginnings of man's moral sense (Mr. Paul has some interesting and original things to say in this connection about the significance of the universal condemnation of incest). Connected therewith also is the question of the origin of language, another factor of tremendous import, the possession of which again marks off man as different from the other animals.

The real drama of man's evolution lies, therefore, in his acquisition of, or endowment with, those faculties which have enabled him to withdraw himself from the life of nature and live in that realm of mental or spiritual ideas and values which find expression in his culture. At the end of his book the author faces the question of how was man drawn out of 'the drowse of Nature' into a disturbing awareness of this spiritual realm. He makes the significant observation that 'man does not belong *by nature* to the spirit. He is even unhappy there', and has 'the longing instead to get away from the human, back into the amoral oblivion of the sensual natural world'. The answer to this question appears to Mr. Paul to be inescapably a theological one, although apparently he does not intend his work to be an essay in theology: 'The more one ponders the mystery of man, the less probable it seems that one mis-shapen hominoid blundered into the realm of the specifically human, and the more probable it is that man was *called* into it, or even *commanded* into it, by Divine act'.

The present reviewer feels that Mr. Paul could have greatly strengthened his thesis, if, when discussing man's sense of time, he had explored more fully the significance of the fact that awareness of the future caused man to anticipate his own mortality; and in this connection more might have been made of the Palaeolithic funerary practices, including those of Neanderthal Man. Then, when mentioning the

*L. Paul, *Nature into History*. (Faber & Faber, London, 1957. Pp. 201. Price 21/-).

Lascaux paintings, it might have been expected that the author would have discussed the meaning of the remarkable picture of a bird-headed man being slain by a wounded bison—a picture which seems to record 'an historical' incident. However, these are only minor points and in raising them the reviewer in no way wishes to detract from the value of Mr. Paul's book, which he would strongly commend as a well-written and an acutely reasoned discussion of a fundamentally important subject.

S. G. F. Brandon

MODERN JUDAISM*

To the Christian, faced with the problem of relating his traditional faith to the outlook of the modern world, the spectacle of the Jew occupied with a similar task must be of particular interest. Indeed in one important respect they both are concerned with almost the same problem, namely, of justifying in the light of modern critical thought, their interpretation of the ancient Hebrew scriptures as divine revelation. Accordingly the book, which has recently appeared, of Rabbi Jacobs merits the attention of those who subscribe to the liberal tradition in Christianity. Dr. Jacobs is the Minister-Preacher of the New West End Synagogue, London, and was formerly lecturer in Semitics at University College, London. His book is addressed primarily to Jews and is designed to deal with a number of pertinent religious problems, 'giving due weight to both traditional Jewish wisdom and modern thought'. Christian interest will naturally be concentrated on those issues which are common to the two faiths. Thus we may note first that, after a survey of the traditional evaluation of the Torah and modern critical estimates, the author concluded that, although they cannot be reconciled, the two views can perhaps be synthesised. This he undertakes to do, endeavouring to show that there is a good rabbinical tradition for recognising that revelation is essentially an encounter between the divine and the human, 'God revealing His Will not alone *to* men but *through* men. In meeting the situation created by the critical study of the Torah Dr. Jacobs thinks that Judaism is in a better position than Christianity, because Christian soteriology is based upon the Genesis story of Adam's Fall.

In his chapter on the 'After-Life' Dr. Jacobs has some interesting things to say. He recognizes that in modern Judaism, as compared with its rabbinic and mediaeval forms, there has been a marked shift of emphasis to this-world values. He thinks that the cause of this is to be found in the changing political conditions of Jewish life. The emancipation of the Jews from the mediaeval ghetto faced them with the problem of adjusting themselves to living as citizens in modern western countries; thus they have been forced to concentrate their attention upon the practical affairs of this world. Surprisingly the great upheavals since the first world war, including the horrors of Nazism and the menace of the atomic bomb, have affected Judaism less than Christianity, according to Dr. Jacobs. He thinks that in consequence 'Christian thinkers in particular are bent on reaffirming the importance of the belief in immortality for a satisfactory religious outlook. Judaism alone, faced with the many problems raised by the emergence of the State of Israel and given new strength by its exhilarating potentialities, is unlikely to be affected by this reaction in the immediate future'. In discussing instances of Jewish hostility towards Gentiles, Dr. Jacobs claims that most have been provoked by religious persecution, observing that 'the Jew, incapable of retaliating by the sword, wreaked his vengeance by the pen, the voice of Jacob raised in fearful lament at the violence done by the hands of Esau'. His treatment of the problem raised by the ideal of the Election of Israel is frank. According to his view, it is a plain historical fact that the world owes to Israel the idea of the One God of

*L. Jacobs, *We Have Reason to Believe*. (Valentine Mitchell, London, 1957. Pp. 143. Price 15/-.)

righteousness and holiness, and he thinks that the Jew is justified in believing that, while there is truth in other religions, a far greater degree of truth is embodied in his own. For the Christian it is perhaps salutary to learn that for the Jew Christianity is certainly 'to be considered idolatrous', and that Judaism 'teaches that the central dogma of Christianity strikes at the roots of pure monotheism' (pp. 135–6).

The present reviewer would have been interested to have learned whether Dr. Jacobs thinks that, if ever the state of Israel gains possession of the site of the Temple, the Temple should be rebuilt and its sacrificial system restored, since continuation of the cultus of Judaism was only made impossible by Gentile violence in A.D. 70. To the Gentile observer it would appear that modern Jews would be faced with a curious, and possibly an embarrassing, situation, if the ancient prayer of their nation were fulfilled and Zion became a Jewish possession once more.

S. G. F. Brandon

ORIGEN. THE SONG OF SONGS. COMMENTARY AND HOMILIES*

This is a good piece of translation, well edited with fifty-eight pages of notes. It gives us all that survives (or almost all, for there is one fragment of an earlier Commentary embedded in the *Philocalia* but ignored by Fr. Lawson) of Origen's work on the Song of Songs, that is a Preface and three books of a Commentary translated by Rufinus and two Homilies translated by Jerome.

The work raises in an acute form the subject of allegorizing. Fr. Lawson in the course of his Introduction and Notes evinces the greatest admiration for Origen's sentiments about the relation of the Church to Christ and the relation of the individual soul to Christ expressed in this work on the Song of Songs, and nowhere seriously discusses whether the allegorical treatment of this book is legitimate or not. It is easy to imagine that the rich and in many ways charming tradition of allegorizing the Song of Songs begun by Origen and continued through the Middle Ages, and the skilful and often profound treatment of his two main subjects by Origen himself in this work, might blind the eyes of an editor to the question of whether allegorizing, upon which all the delightful superstructure rests, is not a foundation of sand. To any honest eye, the only connection between the theological conclusion drawn by Origen and the text of the Song of Songs is pious fancy: sometimes the fancy is exquisitely poetic and sometimes painfully obtuse, but at no single point does it cease being pious fancy and become anything more serious. It might of course be replied that because the Song of Songs is canonical Scripture therefore it is inspired, and if it is inspired allegory alone (and presumably allegory of this Origenistic type deriving almost wholly from the Alexandrian Jew Philo) can make sense of it for Christian ears. But this reply is surely the *reductio ad absurdum* both of the concept of inspiration and of the justification of allegorizing.

University of Nottingham. R. P. C. Hanson

*Translated and annotated by R. P. Lawson (Ancient Christian Writers 26). Pp. 385. (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press; London, Longmans, Green, 1957. Price 21/-.)

SAVING THE APPEARANCES*

It is a rare thing to find a book which makes a quite new approach to the familiar world in which we live and puts forward ideas which could have a far reaching influence upon the world of the future. But I have certainly found Mr. Barfield's treatment of 'the appearances' illuminating, and, in the main, convincing and I have little doubt that if our world could experience something of that change of outlook which the author desires the prospect for the future would be a great deal healthier than at present it seems to be.

**A Study in Idolatry*, by Owen Barfield. (Faber & Faber; price 21/-.)

The greater part of the book is devoted to an examination of man's relationship to nature. In company with Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, Barfield criticizes the assumption that the human consciousness and mentality has remained virtually unchanged throughout human history. The altogether distinctive characteristic of man up until perhaps 3,000 years ago was his sense of *participating* in nature through his kinship with the phenomena by which he was surrounded: these were representatives of a reality behind and beyond the phenomena and yet of the same nature as himself. There were the beginnings of a challenge to this view both in the early science of Greece and in the puritanical exclusiveness of Israel but there was no general breakdown of this form of consciousness until the modern scientific revolution brought about the radical change whose effects we are only now coming to realize. The ideal of non-participation came to be increasingly accepted. Man stands over against nature and there is no reality behind or beyond nature. And the phenomena of nature become *idols* because they are imagined as enjoying that independence of human perception which belongs only to the ultimate reality itself.

But Barfield believes that there are signs of change beginning to appear. The emergence of the whole concept of the unconscious, the obvious dangers of over-specialization, the inadequacy of the purely empirical approach—these all suggest that the way may be opening for a new kind of participation (the author calls it 'final participation'). It was adumbrated by Goethe, it has been powerfully advocated by Rudolf Steiner and it awaits expression within the specifically Christian context. In his closing chapters Barfield writes suggestively on the Incarnation of the Word and the Mystery of the Kingdom. It is through the coming of the Word into human life and the new stirring of the Word in the human consciousness that man can be saved from his idolatry, and brought to a true participation in the Spirit and in a common life in the cosmic Christ.

I have tried to give a brief sketch of the book's main thesis but I cannot attempt to bring out its numerous suggestive comments on the human consciousness, both in the past and in the present. I have the feeling that the author is more at home and more impressive when dealing with the Graeco-Roman strands of our Western civilisation than he is when he turns to the Hebraic tradition. The chapter on Israel is a fine one but I wish that its insight could have been more fruitfully employed in the later constructive part of the book. Yet all in all this is a fresh and original book not always easy to read, but rarely leaving us in doubt that it has something very important to say.

F. W. Dillistone

WHY SHOULD WE READ THE BIBLE?*

Richard Green, the historian, described the English people as the people of a book, i.e. the Bible. Englishmen to-day, to judge by the variety of translations of the Bible into vernacular English which have appeared in the last thirty years and their popularity, are deeply interested in the Bible, but outside fundamentalist circles do not appear to accept it as an authority. The 'Theology of the Word' proclaimed by Barth and Brunner has proved so influential that all schools of thought in every church have been affected by it. The authority of the Bible has therefore become peculiarly relevant to the contemporary situation. Professor Reid's book is important because it fulfils a need of the times in seeking to answer the question 'Why should a Christian read the Bible?'. He surveys with succinct clarity the Christian attitude towards the Bible since the Reformation, beginning with the views of Luther and Calvin. The minds of both of them, he demonstrates, were too dynamic to allow

**The Authority of Scripture*, by John K. S. Reid (Methuen. Price 25/-.)

them to yield to bibliolatry. But on the other hand they were unable in fact to reconcile the literalist and allegorical method of interpreting the Bible, which they had inherited from the days before the reformation, with the new freedom of humanist scholarship. A chapter on Luther and reformed orthodoxy shows how biblicism ultimately prevailed. 'The new insight into the living truth of the Gospel fades; the living Word of God which Scripture communicates becomes stereotyped in the pages of Scripture. Behind the armoured strength of verbal infallibility, the living authority of the Word of God withdraws and its place is taken by the rigid authoritarianism of a printed word' (p. 101).

A chapter of great interest is devoted to the Roman view of biblical authority. Professor Reid carefully analyses the claim of the Roman Church to be the supreme interpreter of Scripture and exposes the Roman account of the relations between scripture and tradition. There follows an account of the Roman attitude towards the critical study of the Bible which up to 1943 the Papacy opposed with ill-informed intransigence. In 1943 Pius XII published the encyclical *Divino afflante Spiritu,* which for the first time since the Council of Trent reduced the supreme authority of the Vulgate by stating that its authority is now held to be in no way incompatible with a concern for the originals of which it is a translation. Interpreters are urged

> 'to take advantage of every indication provided by recent research in an endeavour to discover the distinctive genius of the sacred writer, his condition in life, the age in which he lived, the written or oral sources he may have used, and the literary forms he employed' (p. 148).

At the same time, as is almost inevitable from the Roman conception of authority, scientific study of the Bible is still severely restricted to find explanations which are faithfully consonant with the teaching of the church, particularly with the traditional doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture. Professor Reid produces evidence from reviews and books which show that the limitations imposed officially are to some extent disregarded in practice. Only the hypothetical original text has to be judged inerrant, and a distinction can be drawn between the original and spiritual meaning of the text. This methodology may well permit in the end as much freedom in investigation as anyone could desire.

Professor Reid devotes separate chapters to the Bible-given authority as the inspired words and inspiring instrument of God (with particular references to Sandy's great work on this subject), to the Bible's authority as the revelation of God, and to the theology of the Word as expounded by Barth and Brunner. For Professor Reid 'if it is the pressure of the Holy Spirit even in no marked degree that is the basis of authority then the whole of the Bible is returned to us—but alas! without any real compelling force' (p. 175). Should this however be a matter of regret? Surely the authority of the Bible should have that of a persuasive invitation and rational warning rather than that of a 'real compelling force'.

In the chapter on revelation Professor Reid discusses the notion of progressive revelation, which he regards as an attempt to save the authority of the Bible when it was almost destroyed in the conflict between literalism and the combination of scientific discovery and the findings of criticism. Professor Reid's own sympathies obviously lie with Barth and Brunner, of whose theology of the Word a lucid account is given. The author's own conclusions may be summarised as follows. (1) The Bible is the book about Jesus Christ. (2) The Bible sets forth the promise of Jesus Christ and its fulfilment. (3) It proclaims the pattern of sacred history through which God is known. (4) Jesus Christ is known through the Old Testament though not personally. (5) Jesus Christ is by His own testimony to be found in the Old Testament as well as in the New. (6) The Bible witnesses to Jesus Christ and his presence.

These conclusions rest on the presuppositions and christology of 'biblical theology' and demand a longer examination than can be given in a review. It would appear however that the time has come for biblical theologians to ask themselves why the Bible, in spite of its exaltation at their hands, is still a diminishing influence. Biblical theology has done very little to advance the cause of evangelism. The renewed interest in the Bible has come from the recrudescence of fundamentalism. Biblical theology supplied a much needed corrective to the notion of the Bible as the record of a progressive knowledge of God by showing it to be the record of men's encounter with God in heart, will, and mind. But it remains an encounter within the forms of a particular tradition which the Jesus of history used with such spiritual dynamic that he broke it. The New Testament records both a fulfilment and a revolution so that Jesus founded a new religion, and yet it was a religion which could claim to be the heir of a long religious tradition. This is the paradox which Marcion sought to resolve by asserting that the new faith had disallowed the Old Testament. It is the same paradox which baffles the modern enquirer. Barth and his followers seek to resolve it by claiming that both the Old and New Testaments are a recorded witness to Jesus Christ, the judging and forgiving Word of God. Then the Bible has authority only for those who so find it, while those who so find it will ascribe to it that authority. The Bible then becomes whole and entire the sacred esoteric text for a gnostic sect.

Professor Reid himself seems to agree with this by suggesting that passages from the Bible which in themselves offend the common conscience of mankind may if, explained in terms of the biblical theologian's key-pattern, be used in public worship.

> 'By what right, in the singing of the proper Psalm for Whit-Sunday, is the congregation directed to "omit verses 21 to 23?: 'But God shall wound the head of his enemies', etc.". No doubt the phrases here used fall roughly upon over-refined ears. Yet what is being conveyed in these harsh terms is the undoubted truth that, since God is righteous, unrighteousness is inimical to Him and to His purposes and by the very token of His concern for righteousness His wrath must be visited upon unrighteousness' (p. 267).

Presumably the same argument could be used for the retention of the cursing psalms and the closing verses of psalm 137 in public worship. But sophistical explanations of this sort do nothing to obliterate the meaning of the words when they were originally uttered, and ignore the fact that the psalms are *selected* portions of Scripture taken out of their context and used for public worship. The unity of the Bible would seem to be that of a unique religious tradition culminating in Jesus, who can only be fully known when recognised within that tradition as the Christ. The tradition, i.e. the Bible, possesses a supreme authority for men who find in their own lives their spiritual needs met and satisfied by reference to it as Jesus himself finally disclosed. Within the tradition however, just because it is historical and given through men, can be found much that was only alive in its own time, as Paul demonstrated of the ceremonial law, but yet needs to be studied if the tradition is to be fully understood and apprehended.

H. C. Snape

THE DIALECTIC DOCTOR*

We have here—in some 699 pages—at most half of what Barth proposes to give us on the doctrine of God. Lest this prospect should seem altogether overwhelming, let it be said at once that the present volume contains, as an Editor's Preface, an admirable summary in less than sixty lines of the main themes of the book, so we have the inestimable advantage of knowing the wood before we pass to the examination of

**Church Dogmatics*, by Karl Barth, Volume II, *The Doctrine of God* Part 1. Authorized translation from the German. (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. Pp. 699, 1957. Price 50/-.)

every tree. Further, the same preface most usefully calls the reader's attention to Barth's theological autobiography which is to be found on pp. 634–8, included in one of those long insertions in smaller type which are a familiar feature of Barth's writing; insertions which are always scholarly, and which often seem much more intelligible than the text itself. Some of the most fascinating in the present volume are perhaps those on the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Knowability of God (pp. 79–84); on 'man in the cosmos' (pp. 117–125); on the concept of God's personality (pp. 287–297); on the attributes of God (pp. 337–341); on the concept of Wisdom (pp. 432–439); on God's omnipresence (pp. 464–468): on divine knowledge (pp. 567–586); on God, eternity and time (pp. 631–638). But there are of course many others—indeed a page is hardly complete without one.

As we would expect, the book from beginning to end is a sustained endeavour to write theology always making sure to put God first (as it would popularly be described). 'There cannot be allowed here any precedence of man' who has no 'right of disposal over (this) object' as he has 'continually and obviously in regard to all other objects' (pp. 21, 22). But throughout the book there is the further emphasis of God-in-action rather than on anything so dismally philosophical as God's being. Indeed, this distinction in God's case between being and action is something which Barth will never allow. It is in fact the main reason why he rejects any doctrine of analogy (pp. 75 fllg.). For the distinction implies, he would say, a parallel distinction between possible and actual knowledge, which would make our knowledge of God depend as much on man as on God, and would therefore detract from the primacy of God. Natural Theology—the traditional study of God's being—is a vigorous but pathetic fallacy. For there is no hope of knowing God except by his action, and no hope of knowing that except by Jesus, when there is consequently no need for a natural theology. Even so, Barth seems to say, better to have natural theology than nothing whatever. Better to have a cave in a primitive endeavour to match up to the elements, than to have nothing at all. But those with luxury flats given to them without the asking cannot but pity the cave man for his pathetic idea that he has found the security which they alone possess.

So Barth holds that whereas to have ordinary knowledge about God would involve *our* bringing God alongsidse us, this difficulty is avoided and we preserve God's primacy, once we agree that knowledge of God only arises from the revelation of himself in Jesus Christ, and this Sign-Word is only a particular manifestation—a secondary objectivity (as he calls it)— of that primary objectivity which is God as self-giving. Hence (says Barth in effect) we have not betrayed the utter 'other-ness' of God. But is this distinction between primary and secondary objectivity a description of God when it must be, I should have thought, something which only God knows) *or* an endeavour *by Barth* to make *his own* theological talking consistent? If the latter, why should there not be other possibilities? Why for example shouldn't we speak of God's primary and secondary objectivity, yet talk of God acting in one way to give the subject matter of Natural Theology, and acting in another way to give the subject matter of Revelation.

The second chapter in the book—some 400 pages—again emphasises God's *activity,* but now Barth wishes not so much to avoid the contrast with being, as the tendency to think of God's action only in terms of observable ways and works. For this reason he does not speak of God's 'attributes', rightly thinking that such a phrase is shockingly misleading. He prefers to speak of God's perfections. For my own part I found this section altogether more intelligible and interesting. Barth rightly reminds us (p. 281) that we might, for example, find ourselves so giving 'a definition of the divine love on the basis of a common concept of love', as to 'rob God of His deity'.

Certainly, when we talk of God in terms of human attributes, there must always be logical qualifiers, e.g. 'perfect', if our assertions are to be significant. But Barth would no doubt go further in claiming that God has himself (in revelation) selected the 'words' for our use. But is this a description of fact? Or Barth's way of understanding Revelation? Or would he deny the antithesis and say that he says what he does about Revelation because it is given with that character written on it?

Even so I found Barth's proposal to give us a logical spread of concepts from the 'perfection' of God very illuminating. Beginning with God's self-giving, this becomes tractable in terms of freedom and love which are then 'expressed and translated' respectively in terms of holiness, righteousness and wisdom on the one hand, and grace, mercy and patience on the other. Verity and omnipresence, constancy and omnipotence, eternity ad glory are then to be seen as further 'expressions' of God's 'freedom'. In this way, we see how a dogmatic scheme can put God first, displaying the whole of God's attributes in subordination to God as self-giving. So 'theology as a whole, in its parts and in this interconnexion, is a peculiarly beautiful science'. Would Barth agree to compare this beauty with that of (say) some mathematical proofs?

This brings us back to a point I raised earlier. Certainly Barth elaborates a way of talking which puts God first, where every theological assertion is controlled by this *motif*. Nor does he find it difficult to show the futility of some other positions which can talk of God so straightforwardly as to 'rob Him of his deity'. It might, then, be an advantage, if we all talked like Barth. But even Barth's way of talking is to some so difficult and unintelligible that it fails to make its point. Why? Partly, at any rate, because of his insistence that it must never have any links with things natural. If there are certainly those who would rob God of His deity, there is surely the opposite blunder of those who would rob God of his world.

So while we *all* might wish to preserve God's primacy, *need* we talk like Barth to do so? Not unless he would believe his language to be a guaranteed expression of God's activity; not unless we should suppose that whenever we put God first, we talk from God's standpoint. But can there be any satisfaction to the theologian if he is to believe that he only fails to rob God of his deity, when he makes himself God?

Certainly we must put God first in our thinking and talking; we must have an 'activist' epistemology—and no one has done more to insist on these important themes than Barth. But fortunately it does not follow that we must talk and write precisely as Barth does. Indeed, in his autobiography he would seem to agree. For example, on p. 635 he says: 'If we claim to have too perfect an understanding of the Gospel, we at once lose our understanding'; again, 'to be legitimate exposition of the Bible', some assertions in the past have certainly 'needed others no less sharp and direct to compensate and therefore genuinely to substantiate their total claim'. Further, 'The doctrine of the living God will not tolerate . . . such concentrations' in theology as come from yielding wholly to certain 'compelling ideas' (p. 636).

Barth will always be a classic example of one way of doing systematic theology in the grand style, yet different from traditional schemes, such as Thomism, which were associated with a particular brand of metaphysics. But may we not some day hope for one theological language which can do justice to the insights of *both* the Angelic and the Dialectic Doctors? The hope is only unreasonable if either should suppose that his language was guaranteed by God. But is it? If not, we might still hope for a scheme which expressed the unique distinctiveness of the Christian faith, while not severing its connection with what all reasonable men—be they Christians or not—believe about the world and their lives.

I. T. Ramsey

'BY LIBERAL THINGS SHALL HE STAND . . .'

A new book by Dr. Alec Vidler is always a welcome event and his recently published volume of essays and addresses[1] is in no way an exception. For Dr. Vidler is that *rara avis* in the Church to-day—a biblical theologian who does not adopt the jargon of continental protestantism which is all but meaningless to the uninitiated. Of this he confesses himself to be uncertain 'whether it is the swan song of Christianity on the European continent or the signal of its coming rejuvenation' (p. 20). And he goes on to say that, so far as Britain is concerned, he hears 'the note of authentic and inspired prophecy more clearly . . . in F. D. Maurice and P. T. Forsyth, theologians who delivered their word in the spring and autumn of the Liberal period, than in any contemporary Christian spokesman'.

In spite of this admission Dr. Vidler dissociates himself from Liberalism with a capital 'L'; but on the whole he is fair in his appraisal of the debt owed to it, though, like many others, he tends to exaggerate the negative and critical aspects of Liberal theology; nor, perhaps, does he sufficiently allow for the continuing need of these aspects at a time when thought, like everything else, is all too stereotyped and mass-produced. Still, 'all labels are libels' and Dr. Vidler leaves one in no doubt as to the essential liberality of his outlook and his concern for the *esprit large* which is characteristic of all true liberalism. Thus the title of his book is well chosen and fully justified by its contents.

Certainly these range over a wide variety of subjects. They include: 'Freedom and Responsibility', 'History according to the Bible', Bishop Gore and Liberal Catholicism' (Gore is shown to have fallen sadly short of the liberalism he aimed at), 'What is Anglicanism?' and 'The appalling religiousness of America' (a salutary antidote against too facile hopes of a religious revival from across the Atlantic).

Perhaps the chapters on freedom and responsibility and history according to the Bible are the most solid part of the book, and it is no small achievement that on such well worn subjects Dr. Vidler should have plenty that is really worth while to say. For example, on the doctrine of predestination he says:

> 'Properly understood (it) means not that God has arbitrarily foreordained some people to heaven and others to hell, but that every man and all men are foreordained to eternal life in so far as they are in Christ and accept from Christ the freedom wherewith he has made men free, and that every man and all men are foreordained to eternal loss or eternal death in so far as they refuse the offer of life and freedom in Christ and determine to make themselves the centre of the world' (p. 55).

And about history he asks:

> 'What we really need to know is whether according to the Bible historical existence, life in this world, what we do in history and what we make of history, has any ultimate, permanent, intrinsic meaning and value. In other words, does God care intimately about culture and civilization, about politics and the struggle for social power? Or does he, like many latter day Christians, really care intimately and passionately only about the salvation of individuals and about the Church considered as quite distinct from, and infinitely superior to, the civilizations with which it happens to be mixed up? Are this world and its history in the last resort just incidental scenery for the drama of testing and saving souls? Is it the souls that come out of history and are rescued from the world that alone matter in the end, and would any other stage or scenery do just as well? Are all civilizations, are all historical conditions fundamentally as good or as bad as each other?' (p. 90).

[1] *Essays in Liberality*, by Alec R. Vidler. (S.C.M. Press, 1957. Price 15/-.)

There are good biblical reasons, he maintains, for giving a negative answer to all but the first of these questions.

When he comes to the consideration of what Anglicanism is, Dr. Vidler admits that some of the best and brightest of our younger theologians are those who have been attempting to develop an Anglican version of neo-Thomism or neo-Calvinism; but such attempts, he thinks, are no more than *tours de force* and marginal manoeuvres (p. 161). In his view, 'Anglican theology is true to its genius when

> 'It is seeking to reconcile opposed systems, rejecting them as exclusive systems, but showing that the principle for which each stands has its place within the total orbit of Christian truth, and in the long run is secure only within that orbit or (in the idiom of to-day) when it is held in tension with other apparently opposed, but really complementary, principles' (p. 166).

It is therefore a theology of reconciliation and of comprehension, but this does not mean that it is one of moderation and sitting on the fence. On the contrary

> 'Rightly understood and in its genuine representatives, it is a theology not of fog or haze, but of thunder and lightning: a theology which comes down off the fence, but not always on the same side, and which certainly does not fall into a copy-book place on a party line. It is a theology, of which you can never feel that you know just what it is going to do or say next—which is what I always do feel about the theologies of a party and about the theology of moderation' (pp. 168–9).

Altogether *Essays in Liberality* is a book to be grateful for, with such a liberal fund of wisdom and good sense distilled throughout its pages.

D. L. Scott

AUDITUS EST MAGNO SILENTIO*

In these essays, Professor Pieper shows us how a loyalty to St. Thomas Aquinas can be combined with quite a radical view of the possibility and limitations of philosophy, and can also be the starting point for a very challenging discussion of the concept of Justice.

The first book opens with an essay on St. Thomas himself, his life and work, his personality, and his conception of the world. Though it is written with the single-eyed devotion of a disciple, and on a casual glance might seem somewhat uncritical, it has in fact a very robust point to make. We might look, says the author, at the *Summa Theologica,* see its 'tight structure' and ask (in effect): was the writer human? 'Were these sentences really set down by a living man or did not rather the objective content formulate itself undisturbed—neither blurred nor warmed—by the breath of a living thinker?' But to ask such questions shows how greatly we can misunderstand St. Thomas. For he had a personality which, above all, was sensitive to mystery. 'In the work of St. Thomas all ways of creaturely knowing have been followed to the very end—to the boundary of mystery.' So the end was silence. 'On the Feast of St. Nicholas, in the year 1273, as St. Thomas turned back to his work after Holy Mass, he was strangely altered. He remained steadily silent; he did not write; he dictated nothing. He laid aside the *Summa Theologica* on which he had been working, and said to his friend "All that I have written seems to me nothing but straw . . . compared to what I have seen and what has been revealed to me" '. Here is the Silence of St. Thomas—a silence not of despair but of reverence.

So in the second essay of the first book Professor Pieper is critical of those 'traditional presentations of Thomistic doctrine' which neglect this negative element, of those 'Neo-Scholastic authors who tried to reduce his teaching to a system', and there-

**The Silence of St. Thomas* and *Justice,* by Josef Pieper. (Faber & Faber, 1957. Price 12/6 each.)

by lost all sense of mystery. Rather let the concept of *creature* be central for our thought, and we shall see how we can have knowability yet inexhaustibleness; we shall see how we can have 'unknowability' without agnosticism.

Consistently then, in the third essay, Professor Pieper commends Thomism as an attitude, rather than some particular set of doctrines; and sees such an attitude as combining an 'all-inclusive affirmation' with a 'generous conception of the whole of reality', and a 'trustful magnanimity of . . . thought'. In this way St. Thomas might not unfairly be called a liberal: and the true Thomist will seek to incorporate the insights of the existentialist, the scientist, the psychologist as well as the wealth which is preserved in the wisdom of the East. Like all true teachers, he will 'reflect the totality of truth *and,* in a constantly inquiring meditation' will 'discover and point out wherein lies the relevance of truth to his own time'.

Justice, published some eight months earlier, shows the same fresh and enterprising approach to traditional themes. Allowing, with St. Thomas, that 'Justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due with constant and perpetual will', we are then presented with the question: how do men come to have this 'due'? 'If the act of justice is to give to each man his due, then the act of justice is preceded by the act whereby something becomes his due.' So justice demands something prior to justice, and we are led to recognise that it is God as Creator who is 'the *ultimate* foundation for the inalienability of man's rights' and dues. Justice is a relationship between creature and creature which for its full account and expression needs reference to God.

Broadening the discussion, Professor Pieper then introduces us to various problems which cluster around the concept of Justice. God as the ground of justice can only be called 'just' with great caution. A person may *do* the 'just thing' without *being* just. 'The dynamic character of man's communal life' means that any claim to erect in the name of justice 'a definitive and unalterable order in the world must of necessity lead to something inhuman.' So 'in the affairs of the world, everything depends on the rulers' being just', and if political life is to regain its dignity, the concept of a just ruler must be recaptured. Yet 'the world cannot be kept in order through justice alone'. The 'element of rationality so proper to justice' must be linked with *religio, pietas,* and *observantia*: attitudes which go beyond the inhumanity of pure calculations. Justice is fulfilled in charity, as much as philosophy is fulfilled in mystery, as the *Summa* leads to the silence of reverence.

Here are two books which it is a pleasure to read. They are lucid, brief and to the point, and in calm reflection raise issues which are vital for thought and society. They are invaluable for encouraging bold and honest thinking on issues of high contemporary importance.

I. T. Ramsey

AN ETYMOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL COMPUTOR

Those who express anxiety about the relative values of a classical and scientific education in producing practical results in a technological age, would do well to study Walter Bauer's *Greek-English Lexicon,* fourth edition, 1949-52, recently translated into English by Professors W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich.[1] It represents the highest tribute which could be paid to the capacity of the human brain, and to the industry and scholarship of one man. It is more than a 'word-book' of New Testament Greek, for it includes references to the contributions made by international scholarship to the understanding of the scriptures.

The history of lexical works on the New Testament is chequered, and of relatively

[1] Printed and published by the Cambridge University Press, price £5. 5s.

recent development. The first attempt with any pretensions to scholarship was made by Pason in 1619, further works followed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but all suffered from insufficient attention to the background of New Testament words, in Hebrew, the LXX, and in secular Greek. A new impetus was given to lexicographical studies by the discovery of papyri. In 1910 Preuschen published his Greek-German lexicon which, while it broke new ground in including a study of the Apostolic Fathers, paid little attention to the papyri. However, it was Preuschen's work which formed the inspiration, and the basis of Bauer's lexicon.

No better generalization on the merits of Bauer's work could be given than that contained in a review by H. Campenhausen of its first three instalments. He describes it as a work 'which, when considered as the performance of one man, strikes one as almost fabulous. Not only was there a gigantic amount of material to be mastered, involving the most minute acquaintance with the whole body of Christian literature, but this task required at the same time the gift of combining and relating facts, and of preserving an adequate scholarly alertness which is granted to few people'.

Of the English translation of this monumental work, perhaps one may be permitted to agree with the Balliol scholar writing an essay on translation, and beginning 'all things suffer from translation, except Bishops'. Such suffering as there has been is not the fault of the translators, but of the difficulties inherent in any translation from one language to another; wisely, as they say, they have not attempted to make a literal translation, and advise the reader, if in doubt, to consult the German edition. Departures from the general sense of Bauer's work are few and far between; a representative list of the more significant adaptations and additions is given. Particularly valuable are the references in the text to scholarly periodicals published after the completion of the German edition. The English-speaking world owes a very great debt of gratitude to these two scholars whose work has been undertaken with the same painstaking care as was that of the master whom they follow with self-effacing humility and devotion. Sincere thanks are also due to the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod through whose munificent gift from its centenary funds the financing of the work was made possible.

We may be particularly thankful for the printing in full of Bauer's revised introduction, for herein lies the key to the full appreciation of much which is in the text of the lexicon. It contains a comprehensive study of the history of Koine Greek, the mother tongue of the ancient world from the beginning of the fifth century B.C. when as the language of commerce, it began to replace the other classical dialects, putting new life into old forms rendered sterile by the wear and tear of time and usage. This process is amply illustrated by lists of words showing the respective influence of the classical dialects on the Koine; the latter's peculiarities of grammar, vocabulary and in the use of words; the influence of Roman civil and military administrative terms; and changes in meaning brought about by a variety of circumstances. Certain words, ever decreasing in number, which in the past have been considered exclusively 'biblical words', are shown to be no longer peculiar to the New Testament or to the Septuagint. They were part of the common speech, though by association with religious objects and ideas, they have taken on new meanings. In this sense only were they coined by, or peculiar to, Septuagint and New Testament writers. That these 'biblical words' are ever decreasing in number is brought forcibly home by a further list of parallels taken from secular literature compiled by Bauer after the completion of his fourth edition. While admitting that words and phrases may have had a specific meaning for biblical writers, he rightly warns against the assumption that that meaning was necessarily apparent to a people steeped in pagan thought, feeling, and

custom. He appends a list of words and phrases taken from the New Testament in relation to which misunderstanding was not only possible, but probable.

The text of the lexicon calls for the highest praise. Its type is clear and bold, and its layout excellent. The content is a mine of information and exact scholarship such as has never before been available to English-speaking students in their own language. In the face of such wealth of knowledge, criticism would seem almost irreverent, but perhaps one may be permitted to express the view that the treatment of some words, notably those on which critical issues of doctrinal interpretation depend, have not been altogether without a certain theological bias. Ἀγαπητός = beloved, for instance, is described as 'inducing strongly towards meaning *only-beloved'*, but the only evidence for this assumption is by way of reference to modern literature with a strong predilection in its favour, while the more contemporaneous authors found it necessary to insert μόνος to secure that meaning. *Robbery* is rejected out-of-hand as a possible meaning for ἁρπαγμός, in Phil. 2:6, despite Genesis 3:22f, the author of which evidently thought it necessary that such steps should be taken as would render an act of aggression impossible—but it is a difficult word to fit into a theological pattern!

L. B. Cross

CHRISTIAN ORIGINS*

This is the first single-volume commentary to appear since 1933, when the last volume of *The Beginnings of Christianity* was published. Foakes Jackson's commentary in the Moffatt series appeared in 1931. This book therefore fills a real need for ordination candidates, parochial clergymen, and scholars alike. It is surprising how much Mr. Williams has been able to pack into less than 300 pages. All the classic problems of Acts are considered and all the work which has been done on them in the last thirty years is summarized and brought under review. The problem of the text and the various solutions which have been suggested as stated here should interest even those who make no pretensions to scholarship. Where there is so much of the highest quality, it seems most unfortunate that such cavalier treatment should be meted out to Professor Brandon's suggestions concerning the history of the early Church as embodied in his book, *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church*. A theory is not disposed of by abuse, *ignoratio elenchi*, and mis-statement. Nobody *need* 'assume that Acts was written with an eirenic purpose to gloss over the past "embittered conflict" between Paul and the Twelve' (pp. 16 and 17). Hypotheses are tested by evidence and their capacity to explain the evidence and give it coherence. Brandon does not suggest that the Church in Alexandria was founded by Jewish Christians who had fled from Jerusalem in 70 A.D. He dates its foundation in the first half of the first century. Williams himself admits when he comes to deal with the Apollos incident the presence of a hybrid kind of Christianity in Alexandria. To say of Brandon's book that it 'suspects not only all the New Testament records but also the apostles themselves of tendentiousness and unscrupulous dealing at every turn' suggests the inference that Brandon accuses the New Testament writers of deliberate falsification of fact. Surely it is the scholar's business to judge evidence in the light of the pre-suppositions and prejudices of the authors who provide it, although there is no need to call in question their good faith. In the history of religious belief the will to believe has to be increasingly taken into account. Brandon is not alone in reviving the theory of Tübingen in an empirical form stripped of what are now seen to be its absurdities when it was first put out. Goguel, Schoeps, and Simon working independently have arrived at similar conclusions which will be strengthened or weakened by their application to the whole gamut of New Testament problems.

H. C. Snape

**The Acts of the Apostles*, by C. S. C. Williams. Black's New Testament Commentaries. (Price 25/- net.)

SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY

The Theology of the Sacraments[1] is a series of lectures delivered by the late Professor Donald Baillie in the Presbyterian Seminary, San Anselmo, California, in 1952, and published after his death with a biographical preface by his brother, John Baillie, entitled 'Donald: A Brother's Impression'.

The introductory appreciation is an important part of the book, for if the reader looks for anything new in the field of sacramental theology he will be disappointed. But if he can carry a brother's 'Impression' through into the following pages, he will recognize the writer's life-long concern for closer understanding between Christians of different theological viewpoints. He brings a high-church Presbyterian doctrine of the sacraments into relationship frequently with Catholic and occasionally with Orthodox teaching. The book is in fact a contribution to the Catholic–Protestant debate, and as such is worthy of study by groups that have as great a concern as Baillie had for Reunion.

Certain lectures—in particular those entitled 'The Real Presence' and 'The Eucharistic Offering'—appear to move far toward points of agreement, but it is in the earlier stages of the lectures that the real ground of difference is laid bare. This is especially the case in the section entitled 'The sacraments as an extension of the Incarnation'. It does scant justice to a sustained argument to extract isolated sentences from it, but perhaps the following quotations may give some idea of the line that is pursued.

'Was not the Incarnation confined to one limited point of time without any extension? So that Christ is present with us now not in the incarnate way but through the Holy Spirit?' . . . 'so that if Christ is still incarnate, He is not incarnate on earth but in heaven'. . . . 'The Holy Spirit does His work, takes of the things of Christ and gives them to us. Christ is present with us, not incarnate in the Church, but through the Holy Spirit working in the Church by Word and Sacrament.'

Catholics are bound to ask what is meant by 'in heaven', and 'the things of Christ', and Protestants must be prepared to show how a doctrine of the Eucharist following upon the above statement can avoid the charge of being 'monophysite'. They must also be able to explain and support the writer's implicit refusal (p. 66 and elsewhere) to use ontological terms in reference to the operations of grace. This after all is the crux of the problem, and should lead to a thorough reconsideration of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. All these points are familiar enough to those who engage in ecumenical discussion, but it is useful to have them set out in the course of an argument which reaches so consciously and sincerely towards understanding.

The book is therefore of value chiefly as a meeting ground for theological interchange, and one has cause to be thankful that the writer has refused on the one hand to avoid rough passages, and on the other to allow reason to freeze before such words as 'sacrifice', 'altar' and 'priest'.

C. B. Naylor

[1] *The Theology of the Sacraments and other Papers*, by Donald Baillie. (Faber & Faber Ltd.; 16/-.)

SHORT NOTICES

Old Testament

The *Books of the Old Testament*, by R. H. Pfeiffer (A. & C. Black; 20/-) is an abbreviated version of his *Introduction to the Old Testament* published in 1941, which has proved one of the most serviceable books on the Old Testament for teachers and parochial clergy. As the author's aim has been to reduce his book to the smallest compass possible, it is presented in a dogmatic form with all discussion of alternative

views and citations of other works omitted. The exposition is strictly historical and should prove invaluable to those who wish to make a first acquaintance with what scholars to-day claim is the historical content of the Old Testament.

Holy Pagans of the Old Testament, by J. Danielou (Longmans; 10/6) portrays non-Jewish characters of the Old Testament, e.g. Abel and Lot, as manifesting different facets of God's cosmic covenant which might perhaps be more popularly described as the holiness belonging to natural religion. A most suggestive book for sermons on Old Testament themes.

New Testament

The Holy Spirit and Eschatology in Paul, by N. Q. Hamilton (*Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers No.* 6; 8/6), a thesis for a doctorate in the best tradition of Scottish theology, treats of a theme which in the long discussion of theology in the New Testament seems to have suffered from neglect. After analysing Paul's eschatology and his statements concerning the Holy Spirit with singular impartiality, the writer expounds Schweitzer's, Dodd's and Bultmann's theories concerning New Testament eschatology. A solid and scholarly contribution to New Testament theology.

The Didache, the Epistle of Barnabas, the Epistles and the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp, the Fragments of Papias, the Epistle to Diognetus, translated by J. A. Keeist, *Ancient Christian Writers*, Vol. 6, Pocket Edition (Longmans; 10/6). For the many clergy and teachers to-day who cannot read Greek this should prove a valuable addition to their shelves. The same may be said of *Beyond the Gospels*, by Roderic Dunkerley (Penguin Book; 3/6). This book brings together all the external evidence for the historicity of Jesus and the birth of Christianity. It deserves to be in the hands of all concerned in teaching and preaching.

Philosophy

Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, by Walter Kaufmann (Thames & Hudson; 12/6). Existentialism has become a blessed word in academic and literary circles and beyond. This book treats it as a trend of thought and philosophical orientation which originated with Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard. If Nietzsche may be classified as an existentialist before the word was coined, we would suggest Carlyle as the one Englishman who could join this company. This is the best book of its kind as an explanation of what lies behind a label which has become a cliché.

Sociology

Parsons Meet Welfare Workers, edited by Harold Lees (John Sherratt & Son; 3/6) gives the story of a conference held at Mottram Hall, Manchester, between Christian ministers and social welfare workers to discuss the situation and function of the Churches in the Welfare State. The book should prove of great value to all engaged in the ministry in industrial areas and has an importance for all who are concerned at the apparent ineffectiveness of the Churches in modern society.

Highways, Hedges and Factories, by E. Moore Darling (Longmans; 10/6) records the experiences of one who at the end of a long ministry in a variety of parishes was for some years canon missioner in the diocese of Coventry. The book reveals a warm-hearted and exceedingly sociable priest who was able to make contact with anyone. Coventry has been lucky to have a canon missioner who recognized that his job was not to teach the parish clergy their job or to conduct parish missions, which are soon forgotten. After reading the book, we are left with a query. It is obvious that anyone with Canon Darling's gifts can evangelise with some success.

But can the Church find 10,000 Canon Darlings, and is that all the Church needs? A book from which all parish clergy, young and old, should derive fortifying faith and hope.

The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion, by C. W. Hume (U.F.A.M.; 8/6). This is an important book, because without any sentimentality it gives the biblical attitude to nature, shows how Platonism robbed Christianity of intellectual humility, so that the gulf between man and other creatures became unbridgeable and animals had no status in mediaeval thought. It will surprise many to learn that the Roman Catholic Church is, in spite of Thomism, more advanced than the established Church in its teaching about animals. The Holy Office holds it sinful to torture dumb animals, while the Gallican catechism teaches that to hurt animals unnecessarily is an act of cruelty. Dr. S. Leeson, the late Bishop of Peterborough, was prevented by his death from bringing the claims of animals to the official notice of the episcopate. Perhaps another bishop is ready to take up their cause.

BOOKS RECEIVED

We have received the following books:

The Book of Comfort, by R.M.T. (J. M. Watkins; 10/6).

More about Jesus, by Mary Cousins (Hutchinson & Co.; 7/6).

The Ornaments of the Church and Ministers, by F. C. Happold: being Part III of *Everyone's Work about the English Church* (Faber & Faber Ltd.; 2/-).

Living the Ten Commandments, by C. E. Simcox (Dacre Press; 6/-).

The Stones of Llandaff Cathedral, by F. J. North (University of Wales Press; 15/-).

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman*

Sir,

In his admirably thorough review of *Insight*, by Bernard Lonergan, Mr. Wren Lewis says: 'Science does *not* provide the pattern of true knowledge, *because it is not concerned with knowing the world at all, but only with working out how to use things*'. The italics are his, and the statement is crucial in the review, affirming his main reason for disagreeing with a book which he clearly admires. I submit that it is a libel on many great scientific thinkers, most of whom are now not alive to defend themselves. The great scientists have been passionate seekers of knowledge for its own sake. If our hold on religious truth demands that we make statements of this kind, what kind of a hold is it? The notion that science is purely pragmatic is a myth created to protect a certain way of envisaging our knowledge of the things that are beyond reason. It is found in all the denominations—I'm not sure it wasn't started by Catholic thinkers of a medievalist tendency, in the period between the two wars, when one could still get a hearing by saying portentous things about 'post-Cartesian man'. Unlike most of our protective myths, it can be dissipated without recourse to a psycho-analyst, because it is verifiably a lie. May I add, in all honesty, that I have been a victim of it for years, and that my notion of theology has been, in consequence, needlessly confused.

Yours, etc.,

(Dom) SEBASTIAN MOORE

Downside Abbey,
Stratton on the Fosse, Bath
December 22nd, 1957

John Wren-Lewis writes:

Dom Sebastian is right, the point is crucial—not just to my review, but, I believe, to the whole debate between authoritarianism and freedom in religion, and indeed in social life generally. Once it is allowed that men get insight into reality as such by the activities of their own minds, our feet are on the slippery slope which leads to the state where those men who can use their minds best (in whatever happens to be the approved way) have absolute authority over the others. In the great universal 'religious' traditions, it was the men who could command the magic formulae, the mythological patterns, who had authority; in Platonism, the men who could penetrate the Reason of the Eternal Forms; in Hitler's Germany, the men who understood how to recognize 'true Aryanism'. In 'Catholic' Christianity authority rests with the ecclesiastical hierarchy who understand the revealed mysteries of Intelligible Being; in Communist Russia, with the men who most truly understand the implications of Marxist–Leninism; and in the scientific age we are now entering, it may well be taken over by the scientific technocrats, if scientists are really persuaded of the claim Dom Sebastian makes for them!

Of course great scientists have sought passionately after knowledge for its own sake, without thought for possible pragmatic applications; but this does not alter the fact that the *logical character* of the knowledge they sought was pragmatic. This is implicit in the very mathematical structure of scientific theories; they are, in modern jargon, *operational constructs*—they answer the question 'How?', never the question 'What?' On this point most modern scientists would be agreed. Great

scientists of the past no doubt often thought they were answering the question, 'What is the Universe really like?', but I am afraid we just have to say they were wrong: their greatness does not prevent them from having been wrong. They were in fact suffering from the hangover of mediaeval 'natural philosophy'.

To-day, scientists' insight into the true nature of their own operations combines with the logical analyses of the philosophers and the revelations of the psychoanalysts in confirming what essential Protestantism first struck out for—the truth that the only way to know *what* reality is is to *meet* it in experience. The creations of the mind may help us to discover more about how to operate on reality in various ways, but they add not one cubit to the stature of our knowledge of reality itself. This is done *by concrete living*, and perhaps most of all by concrete loving—which every man must do for himself, not under authority, but freely.

Modern natural science only got under way when it broke away from philosophical speculation by insisting that all theories be judged in terms of pragmatic tests in common 'interpersonal' experience (this is what 'experiment' really amounts to). In this was already implicit (although it took some time for scientists to recognize it) the abandonment of the claim of the expert to knowledge *of* reality, as distinct from knowledge *about* reality. But at the same time there was also implicit the much more important recognition that common interpersonal experience *is* the ground of knowledge, and it is no accident, in my view, that the 'scientific revolution' took place at roughly the same time as the Protestants were re-emphasizing the ancient Hebrew truth that God is *immediately* known to all men in Love. *This* is the religious truth I wish to hold on to, and I believe the fight to hold on to it is the real battle of twentieth-century theology and philosophy.